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Executive Summary
This report presents findings from the fourth wave of the
American Dream Demonstration (ADD) experimental
study of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). The
ADD was a set of 14 privately funded local IDA programs
initiated in the late 1990s. It was the first large-scale test
of IDAs in the United States and used a variety of
research methods in order to learn about IDAs. One of
these programs, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, was implemented
as a random assignment experiment.
The ADD experiment, which ran from 1998 to 2003, was
the first experimental study of IDAs. In total, 1,103
low-income participants were surveyed at baseline and
randomly assigned to either the treatment or control
group. Treatment group members received access to an
IDA as well as financial education and case management.
The IDA provided matched withdrawals at a 2:1 rate for
home purchase and a 1:1 rate for home repair, small
business investment, post-secondary education, or
retirement savings. Participants who made the maximum
matchable deposits throughout the 3 years of the
program could accumulate $6,750 (plus interest) for a
home purchase or $4,500 (plus interest) for the other
qualified uses.
Participants were surveyed at baseline (1998 and 1999),
again about 18 months later (2000 and 2001), and then
again in a follow-up survey in 2003, about 48 months
after random assignment. Many interesting findings
emerged from these three waves of data collection,
primarily that the program had a positive, statistically
significant impact on homeownership rates at Wave 3
(Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2008; Mills, Gale, Patterson,
Engelhardt, Eriksen, & Apostolov, 2008). In addition,
evidence gathered from extended personal interviews
with 84 experiment participants (59 treatment, 25
control) suggests positive psychological, cognitive,
behavioral, and economic effects (Sherraden, McBride,
Hanson, & Johnson, 2005; Sherraden & McBride, 2010).
While this research provided rigorous evidence of the
short-term impact of IDAs, there was no evidence on the
long-term effects of IDA participation. Effects of asset
building on individuals may not be immediate. To the

extent that asset building produces changes in behavior
or attitudes, the effects may take time to manifest.
Measuring long-term performance is important in
understanding the true impacts of participation in an
IDA program.
The purpose of the fourth wave of data collection (ADD4)
was to assess the impact of short-term IDAs 10 years
after random assignment (6 years after the program
ended). To accomplish this, an additional survey was
conducted among the individuals who participated in
the Tulsa, Oklahoma, randomized IDA experiment.
Combining the new survey data with earlier surveys of the
same individuals made possible rigorous statistical
analysis of the effects of IDAs on program participants
6 years after the program ended.
Data collection ran from August 2008 to March 2009 and
reached 80.1 percent of the baseline sample (855
individuals, excluding deceased participants and those
who had emigrated from the United States). The ADD4
study was designed to address two primary questions:

What are the long-term effects of access to an IDA
program on targeted asset building and overall
wealth among low-income families?
2. What are the long-term psychological and health
effects of access to an IDA program?
1.

Analyses of the data use bivariate and difference-indifferences estimates and also employ regression
analyses, controlling for selected baseline characteristics.
For most continuous outcomes, ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression is used. Logistic or probit regressions
were used for dichotomous outcomes, and Poisson
regressions were used for count outcomes. In all analyses,
an alpha of 0.100 was accepted as the threshold for
identifying significant differences and effects. Unless
otherwise indicated, 2-tail tests of significance are used
throughout the report.
In this report, we detail basic investigation into the effect
of treatment assignment on key outcomes. Each outcome
will be explored and reported in more detail in future
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publications. Below we briefly highlight the central results
of the ADD4 study on the five allowable uses and net
worth.
Homeownership
Both the treatment and control groups experienced large
increases in homeownership between Wave 1 and Wave
4 and there is no observed significant effect of treatment
on the level of homeownership among the full sample.
However, among participants with an above-median
income at baseline (about $15,480 per year), treatment
significantly increased both homeownership rates and
duration of homeownership.
Home maintenance and repair
For the full sample, there was no impact of the treatment
on home repairs, the dollar amount spent on repairs, or
housing price appreciation. Treatment group members
did report however, that the estimated cost of unmade
repairs was significantly lower compared with the control
group. Among baseline homeowners, treatment group
members experienced a significantly higher rate of
housing price appreciation and were less likely to report
foregoing needed repairs.
Education
There is a significant positive impact on education enrollment among the treatment group at Wave 4. No
significant impacts are found on increase in level of
education or degree completion among the full sample.
Among those who reported high school education or less
at baseline, there is a significant positive effect on the
likelihood of gaining “some college” among treatment
group members compared to the control group. Further,
we find that men experience a larger effect of treatment
on education outcomes than women. Specifically, we find
that men may benefit more from the IDA program in
terms of educational enrollment and attainment
compared with women.
Business ownership
No significant effect of treatment is found on business
ownership or equity.

Retirement
There were very high rates of increased retirement saving
among both the treatment and control group members;
however, no significant effect of treatment is found on
retirement savings.
Net worth
No significant effect of treatment is found on overall net
worth. There is a marginally significant but economically
small effect found on liquid assets: assignment to
treatment is associated with $79 more in liquid assets
relative to assignment to control.

Summary
In examining the five allowable uses, the study finds some
impacts of IDAs on education, especially for males, and
on home maintenance and repair 10-years after the
program. However, we find no impact on homeownership, businesses, and retirement savings in the
follow-up study. The positive findings for education and
home maintenance and repair may suggest that IDAs are
best suited to support asset purchases that can be
accomplished incrementally over a period of time.
Targeting IDAs for education and home maintenance and
repair may be more effective than applying them to
“all-or-nothing” purchases like a house.
These findings may suggest two implications for the field
of asset-building for low and moderate-income households. First, the findings imply that program benefits may
have to be greater or that programs may need to have
longer savings periods in order to result in lasting impacts
on wealth and asset accumulation. Second, long-term
impacts of a three-year program may be a lot to expect.
The findings raise a broader question of whether a
short-term program that provides modest benefits to
program participants can outweigh the many other
factors that influence ones’ social and economic
outcomes. Finally, the results highlight the importance
of using experimental design in generating
evidence-based policy.
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Chapter 1
Background on Asset Building and IDAs
Saving and Asset Building: An Overview
What is the best way to help low-income people improve
their long-term economic prospects? Public polices in
the United States have historically focused on a
combination of income maintenance, consumption
support, and work incentives to help families meet daily
needs. While these policies help families manage in the
short-term, they may not increase long-term financial
stability. In recent years, an additional approach has
aimed to complement traditional policies by helping
low-income households save and accumulate wealth
with the goal of increasing their longer-term economic
prospects.

1.
2.

These programs, such as matched savings and tax-time
savings programs, provide subsidies to encourage
low-income individuals to save for the purchase of
specific assets, such as a home, or for general assetbuilding needs, such as an emergency fund or clearing
debt, and have become a policy option implemented by
governments in countries around the world.

3.

These programs provide one policy tool to help address
growing wealth inequality in the United States. A large
number of studies have highlighted that wealth in the
United States is unequally distributed and highly
concentrated (Keister & Moller, 2000; Kopczuk & Saez,
2004; Wolff, 2010). Furthermore, wealth inequality has
increased over the past few decades. In 2009, the net
worth of the wealthiest 1% of American households was
225 times larger than that of the median American
household, the highest ratio on record (Allegretto, 2011).
Racial disparities in assets and wealth are also extreme:
the latest data indicate a striking inequality of median
net worth of whites compared to African Americans
(20:1) and Hispanics (18:1) (Oliver & Shapiro, 2006;
Kochhar, Fry, & Taylor, 2011).

5.

Beyond the goal of encouraging wealth accumulation
and addressing growing inequities, several research
findings may drive policy support for saving by
low-income people.

4.

6.

The United States already has many public policies
that encourage asset accumulation via saving
incentives, mortgage interest tax deductions, and
other means. However, lower-income households
often have little or no access to such savings
structures, and these benefits primarily accrue to
people in the top half of the income distribution
(Sherraden, 1991; Howard, 1993; Seidman, 2001).
A report from the Annie E. Casey Foundation and
Corporation for Economic Development (CFED) on
the federal asset-building budget finds that the
bottom 60% of taxpayers receive only 4% of federal
asset-building tax expenditures (Woo, Rademacher,
& Meirer, 2010).
Compared to income-transfer approaches to poverty
reduction, asset-development approaches may have
greater potential to foster financial stability
(McKernan & Sherraden, 2008; Moser & Dani, 2008).
While the acquisition of major non-financial assets
(e.g., a house) can transform a household’s standard
of living, the up-front financial cost may be out of
reach for low-income people (Shapiro, 2004).
The process of accumulating assets may, in itself, alter
people’s outlooks and choices. The asset-effect, as it
is sometimes called, is hypothesized to make a
person more future-oriented, to increase the sense of
personal efficacy, and to enhance some positive
behaviors and attitudes (Sherraden, 1991).
People need savings to weather temporary setbacks
such as a spell of unemployment or an unexpected
expense.

As a response to the current asset-building policy
structure that favors higher-income households,
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) were proposed
as a way to include everyone in asset building (Sherraden,
1991). IDAs were proposed as universal, progressive
savings plans, beginning as early as birth, with the aim of
making asset-building policy life-long and fully inclusive
of the population (Sherraden, 1991). Instead, bowing to
practical realities and the challenge of creating a full-scale
and inclusive policy, IDAs were implemented throughout
the United States during a demonstration period as
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short-term subsidized savings programs targeted to
lower-income adults.
There has been limited short-term analysis of the
effectiveness and efficiency of IDA programs, and no long
-term analysis. Given the growing interest in assetbuilding strategies, policy-makers need to know if these
programs have an impact over the long run and whether
they are cost-effective. This report presents findings from
the fourth wave of the American Dream Demonstration
(ADD) experimental study of IDAs, which was designed to
help answer these questions.
The purpose of the fourth wave of data collection (ADD4)
was to assess the 10-year impact of a short-term (3-year)
IDA program. To accomplish this, we conducted a fourth
survey of individuals who participated in the Tulsa,
Oklahoma, randomized IDA experiment that ran from
1998 to 2002 as a part of the ADD. Combining the new
survey data with earlier surveys of the same individuals
enabled us to conduct rigorous statistical analysis of the
effects of IDA eligibility on the subsidized assets and on
wealth, earnings, health, and psychological outcomes of
IDA participants ten years after the program began. In
addition, the ADD4 study includes a cost-benefit analysis
of the Tulsa IDA program, which is presented in a
separate report.

The Need for Asset-Building Policies
The overall perspective guiding this work is that poverty
and well-being, while typically measured as income levels,
are not determined solely by income. Accumulated
savings and other assets also matter (Oliver and Shapiro,
2006; Shapiro, 2001; Sherraden, 1991).
Millions of households in the United States have
accumulated little or no savings and have few assets.
Many more families are “asset poor” than “income poor.”
While the official (income-based) poverty rate in 2006
was 12.3%, the asset poverty rate was almost 26%1 (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2011; CFED, 2009). Families with children
are even more likely to be asset-poor: 31% of families

with children live in asset poverty. When only liquid assets
are considered, this number rises to 52% (Aratani & Chau,
2010). In other words, over half of U.S. families could not
support themselves at the poverty-level for three months
if they lost their income.
Examination of economic disparities in the United States
indicates that different social groups experience different
extents and magnitudes of income and asset inequalities.
As noted in the prologue, the U.S. faces growing asset
inequality by income and by race. Among households
with children, minority households and female-headed
households are more likely to live in asset poverty
(Wiedrich, Crawford, & Tivol, 2010).
These patterns have not arisen randomly, nor do they
result solely from individuals “making choices” in the
market. Historically, asset inequality has been influenced
by officially—or quasi-officially—sanctioned institutions
including land confiscation, slavery, Jim Crow laws,
residential discrimination, targeting of FHA mortgages to
white homeowners, targeting of USDA programs in the
South to white farmers, unequal educational opportunity,
red-lining, and predatory lending. These and other
institutional arrangements have generated wealth
inequalities over a long period of time (Oliver and
Shapiro, 2006).
Today, the non-poor benefit from institutional structures
that encourage asset building, including auto-enrollment
in savings programs, default savings choices and targets,
automatic deposits, and, sometimes, large public
subsidies (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999; Beverly et al., 2008;
Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2004; Madrian & Shea, 2001;
Sherraden & Barr, 2005). In this regard, the United States
has created policies that build assets of the non-poor
(e.g., 401(k) plans) that include both paternalistic
structures and large public subsidies through tax benefits.
The poor have little or no access to such savings
structures and subsidies. Thus, current public policy
exacerbates asset inequality (Dynarski, 2004; Howard,
1997; Seidman, 2001; Sherraden, 1991; Woo et al., 2010).

1. Asset poverty here is defined as net worth below three months of poverty-level income.
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As an asset-building policy targeted to lower-income
households, IDAs have provided subsidized saving
opportunities to low-income families. It is important to
note that, for most IDA participants in the ADD, saving is
not automatic as in many 401(k) accounts—most IDA
participants must take action to save each month.
Low-income families do save in IDA accounts, though
not surprisingly saving remains very difficult (Schreiner
& Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden & McBride, 2010).

Growth of IDAs
IDAs have proven to be popular and have garnered
bi-partisan support in the United States. Over the last
decade, over 1,000 IDA programs with more than 85,000
account holders have been created (CFED, 2011).
Community-based IDA initiatives have received support
from foundations, financial institutions, other corporate
sponsors, private donors, and from local, state, and
federal government.
Federal funding was allocated to support IDA programs
with the enactment of the Assets for Independence Act
(AFIA) in 1998. The Assets for Independence Program
(AFI) is now the largest funding source of IDAs in the
United States, with AFI-sponsored IDA programs in 49
states and the District of Columbia. From1998 to 2009,
the program provided $180 million in competitive grant
funds to community-based organizations to support
nearly 600 IDA projects. AFI programs have provided
more than 72,000 low-income participants with access to
IDAs, resulting in more than 29,000 asset purchases, such
as houses, post-secondary education, and microenterprise.
Proposals to expand IDAs were a staple of the federal
budget during both the Clinton and the George W. Bush
administrations. More recently, the Obama administration has promoted savings in general through proposals
such as the Saver‘s Bonus, which would provide a tax
credit to match low-income individuals’ savings. Thus,
promoting asset-building for low-income households
continues to generate interest at the federal level.

Asset building has also received increasing
attention in other countries. Versions of IDA
projects are being implemented in Australia,
Canada, Hong Kong, Korea, Mozambique,
Peru, Taiwan, and Uganda.
There has also been interest—
in the United States and other countries
—in Children’s Development Accounts.
These accounts aim to encourage the lifelong
habit of saving by promoting saving during
childhood (Cramer, O’Brien, & Boshara, 2007).

Research on IDAs
Several studies on the efficacy and impact of IDAs
conducted over the past two decades have provided
insights into the savings and asset-building behaviors of
low-income households. The Canadian learn$ave study
and the American Dream Demonstration’s experimental
study are the only randomized controlled trials of IDAs to
date.
The Canadian learn$ave study is the largest experimental
demonstration of matched savings accounts. This
experiment tested the use of IDAs to support adult
education and micro-enterprise development among
nearly 5,000 individuals in ten locations across Canada
(about 3,500 in the experimental component). The
learn$ave experiment also tested the impact of additional
services including financial education and intensive case
management.
The longitudinal research, conducted from 2001 to 2008,
includes four waves of data collection with postparticipation follow-up. Compared with the control group,
treatment members demonstrated increased enrollment
in training and education programs. There was no
significant effect on net worth or total savings but
learn$ave did appear to affect the overall composition of
financial assets and have a positive impact on financial
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goal setting, ongoing saving activities, and budgeting.
Treatment group members had higher average bank
account balances and lower retirement savings than
control group members. Results suggest that the
additional provision of financial education and case
management resulted in a higher likelihood of saving, of
qualifying for matched credits, and of saving the
maximum matchable amount. Though these additional
services had little impact on withdrawal of matching
funds, they did significantly increase educational
outcomes (Leckie, Hui, Tattrie, Robson, & Voyer, 2010).
Research from non-experimental studies of IDAs has
yielded additional findings. These studies include studies
using quasi-experimental designs as well as studies with
no comparison group that draw data from participant
surveys and/or account monitoring. While these findings
do not come from randomized controlled trials and may
differ from experimental findings, they can still provide
some insight into savings contributions and participant
experiences in IDAs.
Non-experimental research has identified several factors
associated with a greater likelihood of contributing to an
IDA. Analysis of account monitoring data from the 14
ADD projects shows that use of direct deposit, higher
match rates, and higher match caps are associated with
increased likelihood of contributing to an IDA. Of these,
only higher match caps are also associated with higher
monthly deposits. Participants with higher levels of
education and working students were more likely than
other participants to make account contributions.
Financial education is correlated with increased
contributions in several studies. Research from the ADD
finds that every hour of financial education, up to 8 hours
total is helpful; additional hours beyond this point may
have a negative effect on saving. Conversely, debt may be
a barrier to saving: participants with debt are less likely to
make account contributions and make lower average
monthly deposits in the IDA (Schreiner, Clancy, &
Sherraden, 2002; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007).

participants. Using a comparison group drawn from the
2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation, the
first AFI Evaluation estimates that AFI IDA participation
increases the rates of homeownership, business ownership, and enrollment in postsecondary education (Mills,
Lam, DeMarco, Rodger, & Kaul, 2008). No significant
differences between participants and nonparticipants
were found on savings, home equity, or consumer debt.
There is also evidence that IDAs may improve mortgage
loan terms and protect low-income households from
foreclosure. A report by CFED and The Urban Institute
compared IDA homebuyers with other low-income
homebuyers purchasing homes in the same communities
between 1999 and 2007. The study finds that IDA home
purchasers were much less likely to have high-interest
mortgage terms and two to three times less likely to
experience foreclosure (Rademacher, Wiedrich,
McKernan, Ratcliffe, & Gallagher, 2010).

The American Dream Demonstration and the
Tulsa Experiment
The American Dream Demonstration (ADD) is a set of 14
privately funded local IDA programs initiated in the late
1990s. The ADD is the first large-scale test of IDAs in the
United States and used a variety of research methods to
learn about IDAs (Schreiner et al., 2002).
The IDA program in Tulsa, Oklahoma, was administered
by Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC)
and was the only ADD program that was implemented as
a random assignment experiment. CFED proposed and
organized the ADD intervention. The ADD research
program was conceived and initiated by the Center for
Social Development (CSD) at Washington University in St.
Louis. For the ADD experiment, the CSD organized the
selection of the site and the survey firm, and drafted the
initial survey instrument. Abt Associates was selected to
conduct random assignment, data collection and initial
analysis.

Evidence from non-experimental research also suggests
that IDAs encourage the purchase of assets among
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The ADD Experiment
Selection into the Program
Recruitment of participants for the experiment took place
over a 15-month period from October 1998 to December
1999. CAPTC reached out to clients who received other
services, such as tax preparation assistance and homeownership preparation classes, to participate in the ADD
IDA program. The program was also advertised in local
media, and flyers were mailed to former clients and
distributed at other local social service agencies. Those
who indicated an interest in the program were
encouraged to fill out an application, documenting
their eligibility.
To be eligible for the program, participants had to be
employed (confirmed with pay stubs) and have a prior
year’s income below 150% of the federal poverty line
(verified using the 1997 or 1998 income tax return
adjusted gross income; about $25,000 for a family of

four). Applicants who appeared to meet the criteria were
invited for an interview that confirmed the content of
their application, explained the program and the random
assignment process, and obtained informed consent.
Participants in the ADD experiment were informed of the
nature and goals of the IDA program and notified that,
regardless of whether they were assigned to the
treatment or control group, they would not be able to use
other matched savings programs at CAPTC, nor could
they receive any financial assistance for homeownership
from CAPTC for the four years of the study period.
As a result, during the experimental period through 2003,
treatment group members had access to the CAPTC IDA,
while both control and treatment group members could
access a set of other subsidy options at CAPTC that were
less attractive than those available to the typical lowincome household. All sample members could use CAPTC
services for tax preparation, employment, education, child

The Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC)
CAPTC is a multi-service community action agency that serves the low-income population of the Tulsa metropolitan area.
The organization was founded in 1973 and in 1998 described itself as follows:
“The Community Action Project of Tulsa County (CAPTC, formerly known as Project Get Together) is a comprehensive
anti-poverty agency with a 24-year history of providing a variety of services to low-income people. CAPTC’s mission is to
help individuals and families in economic need achieve self-sufficiency through emergency aid, medical care, housing,
community development, education, and advocacy in an atmosphere of respect. Last year, our various programs served
nearly 18,000 low-income households.
“CAPTC focuses intently on its mission: to help individuals and families in need achieve self-sufficiency. All programs and
services – current and potentially future – are evaluated and assessed based on their capacity to contribute to the accomplishment of our self-sufficiency directive.
“One of the major priorities which the Board of Directors has established for CAPTC’s future program expansion is the
development of alternative financial services to those currently available to our low income clients. One of those new
services is the Individual Development Accounts program.”

Source: Community Action Project of Tulsa County, “The IDA Program of CAPTC – Informational Packet,” 1998. As cited in
Abt Associates Inc. “Evaluation of the American Dream Demonstration, Final Evaluation Report,” 2004.
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care, and so on during the experiment period. Control
group members could receive homeownership counseling from CAPTC and, if they requested it, they were provided with general financial information and referrals to
other agencies in the Tulsa area that provided similar services. At these other agencies, control group members
were free to seek any service for which they qualified,
including financial assistance for homeownership. After
2003, all participants reverted to being eligible for all
CAPTC
programs.
Treatment group members had access to financial
education, case management, and IDA matched savings
accounts held at the Bank of Oklahoma.







The account earned an interest rate of 2 to 3%.2
Participants could receive matches for up to $750 in
deposits each year, with deposits above $750 in a
given year eligible to be matched in subsequent
years.3
Participants could make matchable deposits for 36
months after opening the account.
Unmatched withdrawals could be made at any time.
Matched withdrawals could only be made six or more









months after account opening.
Withdrawals were matched at 2:1 rate for home
purchase and 1:1 for home repair, small business
investment, post-secondary education, and
retirement savings.
A participant who made the maximum matchable
deposit in all three years could accumulate $6,750 for
a home purchase or $4,500 for other qualified uses.
At the end of the program, participants could request
to put any remaining IDA balance into a Roth IRA
with a 1:1 match.

The financial education component included both general
money-management training and asset-specific training.4
The general financial education consisted of six 2-hour
courses on topics such as saving strategies, budgeting,
credit repair, and financial planning. The asset-specific
classes provided information on a particular asset
investment. For example, participants who were saving for
a home attended classes that addressed how to shop in
the real estate market and how to work with real estate
agents and loan officers. Program staff provided program
participants with assistance and consultation by phone or
in-person, and they sent out monthly postcards urging
participants to make deposits in their accounts.

Figure 1.1

ADD Experiment Timeline
1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Randomization
Baseline Survey
Saving Period
Wave 2 Survey
Cash-out period
Wave 3 Survey
Wave 4 Survey

2. There were no fees to open or withdraw from the account unless the respondent made more than three withdrawals in one year, which induced a $3 fee. They could also use direct deposit to transfer money automatically into the IDA.
3. However, individuals who contributed less than $750 in a year were not allowed the following year to make “catch-up” deposits retrospectively.
4. Participants were required to attend a minimum of four hours of financial education before they were allowed to open the account and to
accrue 12 hours of general financial education, as well as some asset-specific training, before making a matched withdrawal.
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A total of 1,147 applicants were found to meet the
eligibility requirements and were referred for baseline
interview and random assignment.
The Baseline Sample
Baseline interviews were conducted by telephone using a
computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) system.
Because the baseline interviews preceded random
assignment, the characteristics measured there can be
assumed to be strictly exogenous to subsequent
Table 1.1

Baseline Sample (N=1,103)
Mean/
percentage

Standard
deviation

Total household income (monthly)

1,422

744

Age

35.8

10.3

Female

78.4

Bank account ownership

83.7

Married

27.8

Homeowner

21.7

Children in home

77.2

Welfare recipient
Race

27.3

Caucasian

44.3

African American

42.5

Other
Education

13.2

HS degree or less

33.8

Some college

41.1

College graduate
Assets

25.1

Less than 1 month of assets

23.6

1-2 months of assets

10.8

2-3 months of assets

8.7

3+months of assets

43.2

Missing on assets
Debts

13.7

Less than 1 month of debts

21.2

1-2 months of debts

7.2

2-3 months of debts

5.4

3+months of debts

47.6

Missing on debts

18.6

treatment. A total of 1,103 baseline interviews were
completed, usually two weeks after the application
interview. A plurality of applicants was recruited near the
end of the recruitment window. Respondents interviewed
during the last three months of the recruitment period
(October-December 1999) comprise 30% of the total
sample.
At baseline, the respondents were predominantly female
(78%), had children (77%), and were not married (28%
married). Forty-four percent of baseline respondents were
white and 43% were African-American. A plurality had
attended some college (41%) and 84% had either a
checking or a savings account. The average age of
respondents was 35 years. At baseline, 22% of
respondents owned their residence. The mean monthly
household income was $1,422 (median $1,320) while
about a quarter of respondents held assets worth less
than one month of the sample average income and nearly
half had liabilities exceeding three months sample
average income.
Random Assignment
Within one week of their baseline interview, Abt
Associates randomly assigned those with completed
interviews to the treatment or control group and CAPTC
notified respondents of their assignment. At the outset of
the sampling, the assignment ratio was five treatments to
six control group members because of concerns about
differential attrition. About half-way through the
recruitment period, the assignment ratio was adjusted to
one treatment to one control. In total, 537 were assigned
to the treatment group and 566 were assigned to the
control group.
Waves 2 and 3
The Wave 2 survey was conducted between May 2000
and August 2001, about 18 months after baseline
interview and random assignment. An interview with
respondents was first attempted by telephone. If
telephone attempts were unsuccessful, a field interviewer
attempted to arrange an in-person interview at the
respondent’s residence. The response rate for Wave 2 was
84.6%. The Wave 3 survey followed the same process
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Table 1.2

Program Use Among Treatment Group Respondents
(N=537)
Mean/
proportion
Account use
Average monthly net deposit ($)
Average gross deposits ($)
Deposit frequency
Unmatched withdrawals
Took any unmatched withdrawal
Value of unmatched withdrawals ($)

18
1,549
0.50
0.70
552

opened an IDA account, unless otherwise noted.
Overall, at account opening, the most popular savings
goal among account openers, as shown in Figure 1.2,
was home purchase (48% of treatment group members),
followed by home repair (19%) and retirement savings
(19%). Less than 10% intended to save for post-secondary
education or for microenterprise. On average, those in
the treatment group made deposits in about half of the
months they had access to their account. Monthly net
deposits averaged $18 per month, with an average of
$1,549 in gross deposits during the program period.

Matched withdrawals

721

About 70% of participants took an unmatched withdrawal
at some point. About 40% made a matched withdrawal,
receiving on average $721 in matching funds. Consistent

Home purchase

0.13

Home repair

0.14

Figure 1.2

Education

0.07

Retirement

0.13

Business

0.03

Took match for intended savings goal*

0.27

Took match for reason other than original
reason for saving*
Matched withdrawals for multiple purposes

0.26

Received any match

0.39

Value of matched withdrawals ($)

574

Value of match funds received ($)
Proportion who made matched withdrawals for

Reason for Saving Among Treatment Group Respondents

0.10

* n=472 who opened IDA accounts

between January and September 2003, about 48 months
after random assignment, with a 76.2% response rate.
The average interval between the baseline and Wave 3
interviews was 1,449 days for treatment cases and 1,456
days for controls; the difference is not statistically
significant. Interviews were conducted using
computer-assisted telephone and personal interviewing
methods.
Program Use
Table 1.2 describes program use among those assigned
to the treatment group (n=537). Of those assigned to
treatment, 87.9% opened an IDA account (n=472). In
keeping with the intent-to-treat approach used in this
report, reported account-use figures include all those
assigned to treatment, independent of whether they

with reasons for saving, matched withdrawals were made
in roughly equal proportions for home purchase (13%),
home repair (14.%), and retirement (13%). Fewer
participants made withdrawals for education (7%) and
small business (3%). Twenty-seven percent of the sample
made withdrawals for their originally stated savings
purpose, while 10% made matched withdrawals for
multiple purposes, and a total of 26% made withdrawals
for purposes other than their originally stated intention.
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Table 1.3

Program Use by Reasons for Saving Among Treatment Group Members Present at Wave 4 with Opened Accounts (N=368)
Share of treatment
group

Average gross
deposits ($)

Average monthly net
deposit ($)

Deposit
frequency

Probability of any
matched withdrawal

Home purchase

0.46

1,402

9

0.46

0.18

Home repair

0.21

2,278

39

0.73

0.79

Education

0.08

2,330

29

0.66

0.71

Retirement Saving

0.2

2,384

32

0.69

0.71

Small business

0.06

1,526

21

0.49

0.48

1

1,855

22

0.58

0.47

Reason for saving

Total sample

Table 1.3 describes program use by baseline-reported
reason for saving for those assigned to treatment who
opened accounts and responded to the 10-year
follow-up survey. More than 70% of participants saving
for home repair, education, or retirement took a matched
withdrawal. Only about half of those saving for small
business made a matched withdrawal, while savers for
home purchase had the lowest likelihood of making a
matched withdrawal (18%). Based on all metrics,
participants saving for home repair saved on average $39
per month and $2,278 total. Deposit frequency and
probability of withdrawal were also highest among those
saving for home repair.

and 2003 rose by 7 to 11 percentage points for treatment
group members relative to control group members. The
program’s impacts on net worth and on qualified asset
building uses were not consistent.

Although home purchase was the most popular reason
for saving in the program, these savers had the lowest
program-use outcomes, depositing only $9.30 per month
and accumulating at the mean $1,400 over the course of
the program. With the 2:1 match rate, this would result
in $4,200 to put toward a down payment on a home.

Evidence gathered from extended personal interviews
with 84 experiment participants (59 treatment, 25 control)
suggest positive psychological, cognitive, behavioral, and
economic effects. In addition, some IDA participants with
children reported feeling reassured that their savings
would benefit their children by paying for their children’s
education, improving their living environment, or
generally providing for their children’s future (Sherraden,
McBride, Hanson, & Johnson, 2005; Sherraden &
McBride, 2010).

Findings from Waves 1—3
The effects of the experiment on homeownership and
wealth through 2003 were presented in three recent
articles (Grinstein-Weiss, et al., 2008; Mills, Gale,
Patterson, Engelhardt, Eriksen, & Apostolov, 2008; Han,
Grinstein-Weiss, & Sherraden, 2009). The program had a
positive, statistically significant impact on homeownership rates after five years. Among households who
rented at baseline, homeownership rates between 1998

Using ADD Waves 1–3 data, Engelhardt, Eriksen, Gale, &
Mills (2010) estimate impacts of homeownership for lowincome households on a wide variety of social outcomes,
including political involvement, neighborhood involvement, and assistance given to others. They find zero or
negative effects on measures of political involvement.
Results for other social outcomes were not statistically
significant.
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Chapter 2
American Dream Demonstration Wave 4
The Need for Long-Term Analysis
The research discussed in the previous section focuses on
outcomes over the first 4 years of the ADD program and
can be described as short-term impacts. Participants had
up to 3 years to save in their IDAs, and then they had
another 6 months to use their funds for matched
purposes. The ADD program ended at Wave 3. However,
post-participation analysis is important for understanding
the longer-term impacts after the IDA program ended.
There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the longterm effects because, prior to ADD4, there was no
experimental study on the long-term impacts of IDAs
and, indeed, very little long-term experimental evidence
regarding saving policies in general. Analysis of other
(non-saving) policies has shown that long-term effects
can be stronger or weaker than short-term effects.5
Impacts of asset building on individuals may not be
immediate. To the extent that asset building produces
changes in behavior or attitudes, the effects may take
time to manifest. Indeed, the difference between dynamic
impacts that take place over time and static impacts that
are measured at one point in time is one of the key
differences in underlying philosophy between the
asset-building approach and the conventional,
welfare-based approach to social policy. For example,
saving for a down payment may require more than three
years, especially for low-income households. People
might initially use the IDA to invest in education, in which
case their homeownership rates and financial wealth may
not be affected until much later. Starting a business may
yield higher or lower returns during the start-up period
relative to a longer period of time. As a result, measuring
long-term performance is important in understanding the
true impacts of participation in an IDA program.
The incentives built into the Tulsa IDA experiment
suggest one reason why the long-term effects may be
smaller than the short-term effects. Specifically, treatment
group members had incentives to purchase homes before
the end of 2003 (in order to receive a 2:1 match) while
control group members had incentives to delay home

purchases until 2004 (when they would become eligible
once again for a variety of CAPTC home-buyer assistance
programs). On the other hand, financial education and
the impact of the very act of saving and owning wealth
(as posited by Sherraden 1991) might spur members of
the treatment group to maintain or increase gains after
the program ended in 2003.

ADD4 Research Questions and Hypotheses
Propelled by the need for evidence of the long-term
impacts of IDAs, we designed and implemented the ADD4
study. Our investigation was guided by two overarching
research questions:6
1. What are the long-term effects of access to a
3-year IDA program on targeted asset building and
overall wealth among low-income families?
Specifically, we address the following questions by
comparing changes in a variety of outcome variables
between treatment and control members over a
ten-year period.







Does net worth increase?
Do rates of homeownership rise (among those who did
not own homes at baseline)?
Do rates of business ownership rise and does the value
of business equity rise?
Does educational attainment increase?
Does the likelihood of having a retirement savings
account rise and do retirement saving balances rise?
Among those who owned homes at baseline, is the
likelihood of undertaking home improvement greater?

2. What are the long-term psychological and health
effects of access to a 3-year IDA program?
We test whether in the Wave 4 survey, relative to
control group members, treatment group members:






Score higher on a measure of future orientation?
Express higher life satisfaction?
Score lower on a measure of depression?
Report better health outcomes?
Report less alcohol and tobacco use?

5. See Almond & Currie (2010) for a discussion and review of long-term impacts of early childhood interventions and Chetty et al. (2010) for a recent contribution to that literature.
6. The ADD4 study also includes a cost-benefit analysis of the Tulsa IDA program, presented in a separate report and giving particular attention to
capturing both the economic impacts and the social-psychological effects of the program.
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Three Waves of Previously Collected Data

The ADD Wave 4 Survey7

As discussed in Chapter 1, the earlier data in the Tulsa
IDA experiment were collected in three waves from 1998
to 2003. Because three waves of data had already been
collected from this group, it is important to explain the
basic design of earlier surveys before discussing the ADD
Wave 4 survey.

The ADD fourth wave of data collection started in August
2008, about 10 years after random assignment, and about
6 years after the IDA program ended. The potential
sample for Wave 4 was 1,068 respondents. No differential
efforts were used to track down treatment versus control
group members, nor were any information sets used if
they predominantly identified only treatment or control
group members. We imposed these constraints to ensure
that we did not collect a sample of study participants that
was biased with respect to the treatment. Further,
interviews were conducted at an even pace for both the
treatment and control groups, which was important to
avoid bias due to the economic downturn that developed
and worsened during the period of data collection.

The surveys covered a wide range of questions relating to
individuals’ employment, assets, debt, family structure,
education, and related issues. Besides basic demographic
information, the questions also focused on financial
stability and financial knowledge. Several questions
inquired about the participants’ expectations for and
behavior toward their children. In addition, the surveys
included a few questions about life satisfaction and future
orientation.
In the studies mentioned earlier, looking at the outcomes
from Waves 1 to 3, the data from the surveys were
supplemented with administrative data from the
Management Information System for Individual
Development Accounts (MIS IDA). MIS IDA tracked
program characteristics, participant characteristics (both
sociodemographic and financial), and saving transactions
of IDA participants (beyond net savings amount). MIS IDA
electronically imported account information from
financial institutions, and thus provides highly accurate
data on all IDA account transactions of all ADD
participants.
This may be the best available dataset on savings
patterns among low-income families (Schreiner et al.,
2002). CSD designed and created MIS IDA as a research
tool for the ADD, collected the MIS IDA data, and merged
these data with the survey data. Merging this data with
the ADD Wave 4 data is important for various analyses
such as examining saving performance during the
program and outcomes 6 years after program
completion.

Data collection lasted about 8 months and ended in
March 2009. The interviews were primarily conducted
in-person for participants living in greater Tulsa; the 17%
of respondents who lived elsewhere were interviewed by
telephone.
After much consideration, we changed the primary survey
method from chiefly telephone interviews (Waves 1 to 3)
to primarily personal interviews at Wave 4. This was done
for several reasons. First, research suggests that response
rates tend to be higher for personal interviews than they
are for telephone interviews. Second, in-person
respondents give more attention to interviewers, which
typically yields more complete data. The presence of the
interviewer allows for response to non-verbal cues and
allows the interviewer to address respondents’ uncertainty
about answers, and generally reduces item non-response.
Third, questions related to income, debts, and property
ownership, which comprise a significant portion of the
Wave 4 survey, are among the most sensitive survey
topics. Interviewing respondents face-to-face is likely to
make respondents feel more comfortable and forthcoming with financial data (Biemer, Groves, Lyberg,
Mathiowetz, & Sudman, 1991). In addition, a field

7. Some text in this section and in Chapter 3 also appear in manuscripts detailing the ADD4 findings on particular outcomes.
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interviewer may be better equipped to clarify confusing
items or terms related to financial questions. Finally, given
the expected length for survey completion (60 minutes),
an in-person interviewer is better equipped to deal with
respondent fatigue or lagging motivation as the interview
proceeds.
Wave 4 questions retained the format and content of
questions employed in the earlier surveys. Unlike other
waves, however, the Wave 4 survey also asked retrospective questions about homeownership history in
addition to current economic, financial, demographic,
community, and health status. Respondents were asked
to report on their homeownership history starting in
1998: What was their status at that time? When did they
buy a house? When did they sell it? When did they buy
another house? When did they sell that house, etc.?
Using this information, we constructed a homeownership
history for each respondent from 1998 to 2009.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Wave 4 Response Rate and Attrition
At Wave 4, 10 years after random assignment and 6 years
after the end of the intervention, 855 participants were
located and surveyed (80.1% of living members of the
baseline sample). The Wave 4 sample included 146
respondents who were not interviewed at Wave 3 and 48
respondents who had not been interviewed since
baseline. Response rates for each wave are shown in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1

Sample Size by Treatment Status and Survey Wave
Wave 1

Wave 2

Wave 3

Wave 4

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

Control

566

100

472

83.4

428

75.6

448

81.5

Treatment

537

100

461

85.8

412

76.7

407

78.6

Full sample

1103

100

933

84.6

840

76.2

855

80.1

Table 3.2

Baseline Characteristics of Attriters and Wave 4
Respondents

Total household income
(monthly)

Attrite

Respond

Diff

p

Mean/
prptn

Mean/
prptn

T-C

1,418

1,422

-4.19

0.94

Female

0.73

0.8

-0.07

0.02

Age

35.56

35.9

-0.34

0.65

Bank account ownership

0.81

0.85

-0.04

0.19

Married

0.32

0.27

0.06

0.08

Homeowner

0.15

0.24

-0.09

0.00

Children in home

0.78

0.77

0.01

0.78

Welfare recipient

0.31

0.26

0.04

0.17

Caucasian

0.38

0.46

-0.08

0.02

African American

0.47

0.41

0.06

0.11

0.38

0.33

0.05

0.16

Some college

0.4

0.41

-0.01

0.78

College graduate

0.22

0.26

-0.04

0.22

Less than 1 month

0.29

0.22

0.07

0.03

1-2 months of assets

0.1

0.11

0

0.86

2-3 months of assets

0.09

0.09

0

0.92

3+months of assets

0.38

0.45

-0.06

0.07

Missing on assets

0.14

0.14

0

0.99

Less than 1 month

0.24

0.2

0.04

0.19

1-2 months of debts

0.06

0.07

-0.01

0.62

2-3 months of debts

0.04

0.06

-0.02

0.15

3+months of debts

0.47

0.48

-0.01

0.77

Missing on debts

0.19

0.18

0

0.87

248

855

Race

Education
HS degree or less

As shown on Table 3.2, when those who responded at
Wave 4 are compared on baseline interview characteristics to those who did not, we find that Wave 4 respondents were more likely to be female, white, unmarried,
and a homeowner. Wave 4 respondents were also more
likely to have been in the top assets category (assets
equaling at least 3 months of sample mean income
worth) and less likely to have been in the lowest assets
category at baseline. Respondents and attriters were
statistically the same with respect to bank account
ownership, children, welfare receipt, education, debt
levels, age, and monthly household income.

Panel Imbalance
The American Dream Demonstration is one of two IDA
research projects that used a randomized controlled
research design, which makes the study a true
experimental test of the impact of IDA program
participation, by enabling a comparison between two
similar groups whose only difference is their treatment
group assignment. Random assignment, however, may

Assets

Debts

N

Note: The asset and debt categories refer to the value of respondents’
assets and debts relative to the sample mean monthly income.
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not result in completely equivalent treatment groups.
In addition, due to differential attrition, treatment groups
which are equivalent at baseline may become unbalanced
in later waves. For these reasons, it is necessary to
measure important variables at assignment, and to
compare groups on these measures to verify that random
assignment fully controlled for differences between the
two groups. In this section we assess the extent of panel
imbalance in the ADD study sample. We compare groups
among respondents present at baseline, Wave 3 and
Wave 4 (see Table 3.3).
Based on measures taken at baseline (n=1,103 for most
measures), randomization resulted in only a few
significant or marginally significant differences between
treatment and control groups. There is some evidence
that the control group was better off financially at
baseline. The control group had significantly more assets
at baseline than the treatment group (p<0.05), and was
more likely to have assets equivalent to 3 or more
months of income (p<0.05). The control group was also
significantly more likely to own a home at baseline
(p<0.05). In contrast, the treatment group was more likely
to say that their financial situation had worsened during
the previous year (p<0.05). On the other hand, the
control group had slightly higher scores on a scale
measure of financial strain (p<0.10).
As the study progressed, the composition of the sample
shifted at each data collection wave due to attrition.
At Wave 3 (n=840 for most measures), the treatment
group was still more likely to have had a baseline
monthly income above $3,000 (p<0.10). The control
group was also still more likely to have had assets at
baseline worth more than 3 months of income (p<0.10),
although the difference between the two groups with
regard to absolute value of baseline assets was no longer
significant. The treatment group as it appeared at Wave 3
was also more likely to have a checking or savings
account at baseline (p <0.05). At Wave 3, there was no
longer a difference between the two groups with regard
to home ownership, although the treatment group was
more likely to have owned property at baseline (p<0.05).
Conflicting differences regarding baseline financial

hardship remain in the study sample at Wave 3: the
treatment group was more likely to report a worsening
financial situation at baseline (p<0.05), while the control
group scored higher on a scale measure of financial strain
(p<0.10).
At Wave 4, the study survey recovered 146 respondents
who had been missing at Wave 3. Surprisingly, the study
sample composition at Wave 4 (n=855) is more balanced
with regard to baseline characteristics than it is at either
random assignment or Wave 3. However, there is still
some evidence that the control group was at a greater
financial advantage at baseline; they were more likely to
have assets equivalent to 3 or more months of income
(p<0.05), while the treatment group was more likely to
have fewer assets at baseline (p<0.05).

Item Nonresponse
Among the 855 Wave 4 respondents, not every
respondent was asked every question and not every
respondent gave valid answers to every question they
were asked. The former, caused by skip patterns in the
survey instrument and, most often, the non-applicability
of the question to a given respondent (e.g. those who
never owned a home are not asked about home repair
and improvement), does not compromise inference.
When this arises in outcome variables, we analyze those
cases with valid, non-missing data.
The second type of missing data, caused by the
respondent being unwilling or unable to provide a
response, can affect the analysis and interpretation of
study results. In survey research, it is often the case that
these missing values are related to the true but
unreported value of the variable being measured. That is
to say, those with item nonresponse may systematically
differ from respondents.
Across the baseline and Wave 4 data, item nonresponse
rates are most often under 5% of the question-eligible
survey sample for each survey item. On sensitive variables
such as income, nonresponse rates are between 5% and
10%. For the baseline characteristics used as covariance
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Table 3.3

Panel Imbalance on Baseline Characteristics Among Respondents from Different Waves
Baseline sample

Wave-3 sample

Wave-4 sample

Treat

Cont

Diff

p

Treat

Cont

Diff

p

Treat

Cont

Diff

p

mean/
prptn

mean/
prptn

T-C

2-tail

mean/
prpt

mean/
prptn

T-C

2-tail

mean/
prptn

mean/
prptn

T-C

2-tail

Female

0.78

0.79

-0.01

0.755

0.79

0.81

-0.02

0.479

0.79

0.81

-0.02

0.656

Married

0.28

0.28

0.00

0.950

0.28

0.24

0.04

0.204

0.27

0.26

0.01

0.884

Banked

0.86

0.82

0.04

0.121

0.89

0.83

0.06

0.014

0.86

0.83

0.03

0.139

Less than 25

0.15

0.12

0.03

0.135

0.13

0.12

0.01

0.522

0.15

0.13

0.02

0.289

25-35

0.35

0.37

-0.02

0.328

0.33

0.36

-0.03

0.418

0.34

0.37

-0.03

0.455

35-45

0.33

0.29

0.04

0.171

0.35

0.30

0.05

0.113

0.32

0.29

0.03

0.481

45-55

0.13

0.16

-0.03

0.093

0.14

0.17

-0.03

0.202

0.14

0.16

-0.02

0.451

55+

0.04

0.05

-0.01

0.709

0.05

0.05

0.00

0.618

0.05

0.05

0.00

0.770

$1,000-$2,000

0.71

0.72

-0.01

0.625

0.73

0.72

0.01

0.782

0.71

0.72

-0.01

0.897

$2,000-$3,000

0.18

0.16

0.02

0.635

0.18

0.18

0.00

0.918

0.18

0.17

0.01

0.583

$3,000+

0.05

0.03

0.02

0.091

0.06

0.03

0.03

0.069

0.05

0.03

0.02

0.120

Income Missing

0.04

0.04

0.00

0.865

0.02

0.04

-0.02

0.204

0.03

0.04

-0.01

0.468

White

0.43

0.45

-0.02

0.496

0.45

0.49

-0.04

0.227

0.44

0.47

-0.03

0.364

Black

0.43

0.41

0.02

0.455

0.43

0.39

0.04

0.245

0.43

0.39

0.04

0.243

Other

0.14

0.14

0.00

0.928

0.12

0.12

0.00

0.922

0.13

0.14

-0.01

0.717

Less than 1 month

0.25

0.22

0.03

0.362

0.21

0.22

-0.01

0.832

0.22

0.22

0.00

0.996

1-2 months

0.12

0.10

0.02

0.430

0.11

0.11

0.00

0.761

0.12

0.10

0.02

0.298

2-3 months

0.09

0.09

0.00

0.875

0.09

0.08

0.01

0.770

0.09

0.08

0.01

0.850

3+ months

0.40

0.46

-0.06

0.036

0.42

0.48

-0.06

0.073

0.41

0.48

-0.07

0.041

Assets Missing

0.15

0.12

0.03

0.190

0.17

0.11

0.06

0.020

0.16

0.12

0.04

0.064

Less than 1 month

0.21

0.22

-0.01

0.777

0.20

0.20

0.00

0.878

0.20

0.21

-0.01

0.756

1-2 months

0.07

0.08

-0.01

0.565

0.07

0.07

0.00

0.903

0.07

0.07

0.00

0.998

2-3 months

0.05

0.06

-0.01

0.394

0.05

0.06

-0.01

0.359

0.06

0.06

0.00

0.834

3+ months

0.47

0.48

-0.01

0.579

0.49

0.51

-0.02

0.628

0.47

0.48

-0.01

0.816

Liabilities Missing

0.21

0.16

0.05

0.059

0.19

0.16

0.03

0.151

0.19

0.18

0.01

0.623

Unsubsidized Housing

0.74

0.75

-0.01

0.537

0.76

0.76

0.00

0.880

0.75

0.75

0.00

0.959

Health Insurance

0.59

0.57

0.02

0.512

0.59

0.58

0.01

0.688

0.59

0.58

0.01

0.587

Own computer

0.28

0.25

0.03

0.308

0.31

0.27

0.04

0.206

0.29

0.27

0.02

0.425

Own dishwasher

0.22

0.22

0.00

0.958

0.23

0.24

-0.01

0.919

0.23

0.23

0.00

0.965

Own washer

0.53

0.50

0.03

0.304

0.57

0.56

0.01

0.625

0.55

0.52

0.03

0.411

Own dryer

0.52

0.51

0.01

0.727

0.56

0.56

0.00

0.886

0.53

0.52

0.01

0.857

Own refrigerator

0.48

0.51

-0.03

0.427

0.52

0.56

-0.04

0.170

0.50

0.54

-0.04

0.368

Own freezer

0.15

0.15

0.00

0.842

0.17

0.16

0.01

0.600

0.17

0.15

0.02

0.427

Own air conditioning

0.18

0.19

-0.01

0.409

0.20

0.21

-0.01

0.748

0.19

0.20

-0.01

0.789

Own sewing machine

0.22

0.25

-0.03

0.151

0.26

0.29

-0.03

0.259

0.23

0.27

-0.04

0.192

Own car

0.81

0.83

-0.02

0.300

0.84

0.84

0.00

0.965

0.84

0.85

-0.01

0.755

Own home

0.19

0.24

-0.05

0.037

0.23

0.24

-0.01

0.568

0.21

0.26

-0.05

0.106

Own property

0.04

0.03

0.01

0.416

0.05

0.02

0.03

0.043

0.05

0.03

0.02

0.248

Age

Income

Race

Assets

Liabilities
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Table 3.3 (continued)

Panel Imbalance on Baseline Characteristics Among Respondents from Different Waves
Baseline sample

Wave-3 sample

Wave-4 sample

Treat

Cont

Diff

p

Treat

Cont

Diff

p

Treat

Cont

Diff

p

mean/
prptn

mean/
prptn

T-C

2-tail

mean/
prpt

mean/
prptn

T-C

2-tail

mean/
prptn

mean/
prptn

T-C

2-tail

IRA account

0.09

0.07

0.02

0.207

0.10

0.08

0.02

0.207

0.09

0.08

0.01

0.358

Satisfied with general health (y/n)
Satisfied with financial situation
(y/n)
Financial situation worse (y/n)

0.85

0.87

-0.02

0.431

0.87

0.86

0.01

0.562

0.86

0.86

0.00

0.973

0.63

0.60

0.03

0.274

0.63

0.58

0.05

0.164

0.63

0.60

0.03

0.315

0.19

0.13

0.06

0.012

0.18

0.13

0.05

0.020

0.19

0.13

0.06

0.021

No of other adults in HH

0.51

0.53

-0.02

0.611

0.49

0.51

-0.02

0.655

0.47

0.52

-0.05

0.308

No of children in HH

1.74

1.65

0.09

0.277

1.75

1.62

0.13

0.149

1.72

1.62

0.10

0.250

Total assets

14378

18881

-4503

0.014

16677

18729

-2053

0.33

16126

19386

-3260

0.128

Total liabilities

12631

14334

-1702

0.179

13589

14753

-1164

0.42

12995

14690

-1695

0.245

Ownership scale

2.57

2.58

-0.01

0.943

2.82

2.85

-0.03

0.845

2.70

2.70

0.00

0.992

Financial strain scale

0.55

0.58

-0.03

0.076

0.55

0.58

-0.03

0.078

0.56

0.57

-0.01

0.516

Giving help in community scale
Getting help from community
scale
Community involvement scale

0.56

0.54

0.02

0.330

0.56

0.54

0.02

0.263

0.56

0.54

0.02

0.172

0.35

0.35

0.00

0.854

0.36

0.36

0.00

0.652

0.36

0.36

0.00

0.955

0.40

0.40

0.00

0.817

0.41

0.41

0.00

0.852

0.39

0.40

-0.01

0.546
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control variables in the models discussed in this report,
65 respondents (7.6%) are missing on at least one
variable and are thus excluded in models that use listwise
deletion.
The notable exception to the low rates of item nonresponse is found in the variables that sum to net worth.
Net worth is composed of 33 individual asset and debt
measures and 44% of respondents are missing at least
one of these, and are thus missing on the net worth
variable. This high rate of nonresponse is driven by two
measures: car value and non-housing property value,
which were initially omitted from the Wave 4 survey
and—after a supplemental survey to cover these
questions—still are missing for 27% and 21% of
respondents, respectively. For analyses of the wealth,
assets, and debt outcomes, we supplemented listwise
deleted data with imputed data as discussed below.

Analysis Plan and Methods
The ADD4 data were collected to estimate the long-term
effect of assignment to eligibility for the CAPTC IDA
program on various financial and nonfinancial outcomes.
The outcomes of interest are those related to the
behaviors subsidized by the IDA program (e.g. saving,
home purchase, etc.) as well as the potential impacts of
those behaviors on assets, health, and other social and
economic variables. In this report, we detail basic
investigation into the effect of treatment assignment on
these outcomes. Each outcome will be explored and
reported in more detail in future publications.
The ADD experiment randomly assigned study
participants to the treatment and control groups, thus
there should be no systematic difference between these
groups. In principle then, the long-term impact of the
Tulsa IDA program could be estimated as the simple
difference between treatment and control on each
outcome. In the results section below, we include

estimates of these differences for outcomes of interest.
Similarly, in the program evaluation literature, difference
in differences (DiD) analysis is often used when pre- and
post-test measures are available on outcomes, as they are
for many ADD outcomes. In experimental data, DiD may
account for baseline differences in composition between
groups, though not when baseline imbalance interacts
with the treatment effect, as is shown and discussed
below.
To supplement bivariate and DiD estimates and to
improve the precision of the estimate of the treatment
effect, we also employ regression analyses to examine the
relationship between treatment assignment and the
outcome. In these analyses, we control for selected
baseline characteristics in the regression analysis.
For most continuous outcomes, ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression is used. Logistic or probit regressions
were used for dichotomous outcomes, and Poisson
regressions were used for count outcomes. In all analyses,
an alpha of 0.100 was accepted as the threshold for
identifying significant differences and impacts. Unless
otherwise indicated, 2-tail tests of significance are used
throughout the report. All regressions take the form:

W4=a+ bT+cW1+dX+e
where W4 is the outcome variable at time 4, a is a
coefficient on a constant, here taken to be one, bT is the
treatment condition and its coefficient, cW1 is the Wave 1
value for the outcome variable and its coefficient, when
available, dX is a vector of control variables,8 measured at
baseline, and e is the error term.
Corrective steps were taken when influential, outlying
cases biased point estimates of the average treatment
effect. These outlying cases harm the precision of the
point estimate of the treatment effect and inflate
standard errors. For some outcomes, we used robust
regressions, wherein outlying observations are

8. Regression models control for age, income, sex, education, bank account ownership, race, marital status, interview cohort, total assets, total debt,
number of adults in the household, presence of children in the household, receipt of housing subsidy, health insurance, business ownership, nonhousing property ownership, presence of retirement savings, car ownership, welfare receipt, ownership of big-ticket household goods, financial
strain, community integration and involvement, health, and financial satisfaction, all measured at baseline. These covariates capture the main demographic and economic conditions at baseline that may influence the trajectory of respondents with respect to the outcomes.
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down-weighted. For other outcomes, particularly those
with a threshold connected to the common understanding of the mechanism or phenomenon, we used
winsorizing. In winsorizing, extreme high and low values
are recoded to a threshold value. Thus, the direction and
valence of the case is maintained, but its leverage is
reduced. When outcome variables were winsorized,
sensitivity analyses with different threshold criteria were
performed.
In some instances, in spite of random assignment,
baseline sample imbalance existed between the
treatment and control groups, which threatened the
reliability of inference. For outcomes with evidence of this
problem, in addition to covariance control in regression,
we also fit models with propensity score weights.
Propensity score weights account for unequal allocation
to treatment, conditional on observed characteristics.
After weighting, the treatment and control groups are
equivalent on observed covariates. However, while
propensity score weighting can control for observed
differences, there could still be unmeasured differences in
level of economic functioning that we are unable to
control for.
For some of the outcomes, there were strong theoretical
reasons to suspect that treatment may differentially affect
specific sub-groups in the population, defined by
exogenous baseline characteristics. When this was the
case, the interaction of the characteristic with treatment
was investigated using either sub-group analysis or the
inclusion of interaction terms in regression models.
Sub-group analyses were also performed and reported
when a specific baseline population was thought to
experience the effect of treatment in a different way from
the sample at large, with respect to an outcome under
investigation.

The specific analytic approaches used for each outcome
reported below are reported when the outcome is
discussed. Each analysis uses the available analytic
sample, using listwise deletion to remove cases with
item-missing data. The exception is the analysis of net
worth, assets and debts. Because of a higher-than-usual
percentage of item-missing data, five implicates were
created using multiple imputation through chained
equations and used for the analysis.

Limitations
Internal Validity (Crossovers and Contamination)
The internal validity of the experiment depends on how
well it was implemented. We discuss two countervailing
concerns: crossovers and other services. Each issue
applies only to the period through 2003, rather than the
entire study period through 2009.
For the first issue, a formal definition of a crossover is a
control group member who, during the 1998 to 2003
period, received some part of the treatment—that is,
opened an IDA or attended financial-education classes
reserved for treatment. Crossovers could also be defined
more expansively as control group members who, during
the experimental period, received access to CAPTC’s
homebuyer-assistance programs (other than the IDA) or
who were able to open an IDA at some other non-CAPTC
location.
Orr (1999) developed an intent-to-treat estimate adjusted
for crossovers, ITTo, that is calculated as ITTo-= ITT/(1–c)
where ITT is the intent-to-treat estimate, c is the
proportion of the control group represented by
crossovers, and where it is assumed that all treatment
group members participate in the treatment.9 This

9. In the IDA experiment, crossovers are probably not a representative sample of controls; they are probably more highly motivated to save and so
would have done better than the typical control even in the absence of crossover. As a result, dropping crossovers from the sample would undermine the balance between treatments and controls that is the purpose and chief benefit of random assignment.
10. The adjusted effect, ITTo = p(TOT) + (1-p)0 – c(TOT) - (1-c)0. Collecting terms and noting that ITT = TOT/p yields the equation in the text. The formula in the text collapses to the formula given by Orr when p=1. Both formulas are actually upper bounds on the adjustment for crossovers, since
they assume that each crossover household received the full treatment. This assumption seems like an overstatement both because even those
controls who opened an IDA are unlikely to have received all of the financial education and case management that treatment group members did
and because (as discussed in the text below) more than half of those respondents we are counting as crossovers did not open an IDA.
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adjustment alters the magnitude of the estimated
treatment effect, but does not alter its statistical
significance. We generalize this formula to allow for less
than 100% participation by members of the treatment
group (p<1) in IDAs, in which case the resulting
adjustment is ITTo-= ITT*p/(p-c).10
The data show 21 control group members who reported
participating in an IDA program during the experimental
period and an additional 27 who reported participating in
CAPTC’s down payment assistance program, which was
off-limits to both control and treatment group members
under the experiment protocol. Even if all 48 members
were considered crossovers, c is small (0.107 = 48/448),
and the adjusted impact estimates are only slightly larger
than the ITT estimates.11

Table 3.4

Use of CAPTC Services During the Experimental Period
N

Treat

Cont

Diff

p

Social programs

807

0.12

0.09

0.04

0.10

Workforce programs

807

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.39

Medical services

806

0.12

0.13

-0.01

0.83

Youth programs

806

0.12

0.09

0.04

0.08

Small business programs

807

0.07

0.01

0.06

0.00

Home buying programs

806

0.23

0.07

0.17

0.00

Education services

807

0.03

0.03

0.01

0.68

Tax preparation services

807

0.46

0.38

0.08

0.02

Note: The sample for this table includes Wave 4 respondents who
were also in either Wave 2 or Wave 3.

A second issue works in the opposite direction from the
crossover effect. As shown in Table 3.4, treatments were
generally more likely than controls to use permitted
non-IDA social services at CAPTC—especially
tax-preparation services. In addition, although 27 control
group members used home buying assistance services
for which they were not eligible, 90 treatment group
members used such services. It is not clear whether this is
an outcome of the IDA program, part of the IDA
treatment itself, or merely represents treatment group
members misreporting permitted IDA-related
home-buyer education as being part of another CAPTC
program. The main point, though, is that treatment and
control groups received different sets of benefits from
CAPTC.
External Validity (Self-Selection and Motivation)
Efforts to generalize the results for the Tulsa IDA
experiment should account for five considerations. The
first is the condition of housing markets in the United
States during the study period. Between 1998 and 2007
it was relatively easy to buy a home in the U.S. During
that time, favorable demographics, strong economic
conditions, innovations in mortgage markets—
particularly sub-prime lending—and public policies and
programs supporting homeownership all worked to
increase the homeownership rate in aggregate and
among low-income households in particular (Bostic &
Lee, 2008; Herbert & Belsky, 2008). The general condition
of United States housing markets during this period
certainly contributed to the large increase in
homeownership rates we find in both the treatment and
control groups. In a housing market where obtaining
loans is more difficult, IDA program participation may
have a stronger impact on home purchase.

11. As an example of the magnitude of the effect, a 2 percentage point ITT effect would imply a 2.27 percentage point adjusted effect when c = .107
and p(IDA participation) = .90.
12. The median home value in Tulsa County (adjusted to 2008 dollars) was $99,332 in 1990, $111,481 in 2001, and $124,607 in 2007 (Ard, O & Puckett,
D., 2002; American Community Survey 2007). In 2009, the median home price to income ratio for Tulsa County was 2.8, compared to 6.2 for the
nation (National Association of Realtors 2009).
13. Other evidence that may be indicative of the availability of homebuyer assistance programs in Tulsa is the fact that about 90% of both treatment
and control group members with mortgages held fixed-rate mortgages, during a period of heavy sub-prime lending when mortgages increasingly
featured adjustable rates.

22

A second issue is the housing market in Tulsa. Housing
costs in the Tulsa area were substantially below national
averages during the experiment, making homeownership
even more affordable for low-income people.12
A third issue is the availability of other local homeownership assistance. Tulsa seems to have had several
affordable-housing programs during the study period,
which offered financial assistance. For example, Housing
Partners of Tulsa offered down-payment and closing-cost
assistance equal to 5% of the purchase price upon
completion of a home buyer education program (Tulsa
Housing Authority 2008). No matched savings were
required to receive those funds.13 IDA programs in areas
that do not have other effective and competing homebuyer assistance programs may have stronger impacts.
A fourth issue has to do with program design. The Tulsa
IDA program was among the first programs in the
country when it started in 1998. Based on field
experience, many current IDA programs are structured
differently in terms of match rates, maximum available
matches, duration, qualified uses of the funds, and so on.
For example, most of the IDA programs today, funded

through the federal AFI program, offer savings period of
up to 5 years rather than the 3-year period of the Tulsa
program (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
2010). Alternative program designs may result in different
program impacts.
Fifth, although the sample in Tulsa may well be a
representative subsample of the population most
interested in IDAs, it was not a representative sample of
all qualified households. Mills, Gale, et al. (2008) find
substantial differences between Tulsa IDA respondents
and IDA-eligible samples drawn from the 1998 Survey of
Consumer Finances and from 2000 Census data for the
greater Tulsa area. Study participants were more
educated, and are more likely to be single, female, and
black than the comparison samples of IDA-eligible
households. The impact of IDA program participation on
a more representative sample of eligible participants may
vary from those reported here, although our subgroup
analysis suggests that, other than income, there were no
statistically significant differences within subgroups.
To provide additional evidence on this, we drew a sample
from the 1999 Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID)

Table 3.5

Change in Homeownership Rates: IDA Control Group Sample Versus IDA-Eligible PSID Sample
Tulsa IDA

IDA-eligible

control group

PSID sample

Homeownership in Wave 1 (1999)

0.24

0.3

Homeownership in Wave 4 (2007)

0.53

Difference

0.29

Difference

p

-0.06

0.04

0.43

0.1

0.00

0.14

0.16

0.00

Whole Sample

Owners in Wave 1 (1999)
Homeownership in Wave 1/1999

1

1

0

-

Homeownership in Wave 4/2007

0.79

0.84

-0.05

0.28

Difference

-0.21

-0.16

-0.05

0.28

Homeownership in Wave 1/1999

0

0

0

-

Homeownership in Wave 4/2007

0.45

0.26

0.19

0.00

Difference

0.45

0.26

0.19

0.00

Renters in Wave 1 (1999)

14. One potential concern with this comparison is that even after selecting for IDA eligibility in 1999, the PSID sample was substantially different from
the ADD sample on demographic and financial characteristics. In sensitivity analysis, we reweighted the samples using propensity score radius
matching and the basic finding did not change.
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based on the eligibility rules for the Tulsa IDA. The time
elapsed between the 1999 and 2007 waves of the PSID is
roughly comparable to the period between the Wave 1
and Wave 4 surveys described above. Table 3.5 shows
substantial differences in the increase in homeownership
between the PSID sample and the Tulsa control group.
In the PSID sample, the homeownership rate rose by 14
percentage points, from 30% in 1999 to 43% in 2007.
In contrast, among Tulsa control group members, the
homeownership rate rose by 29 percentage points, from
24% in 1998-99 to 53% by 2009. Among renters in the
initial period, the increase in homeownership rates was
19 percentage points higher in the Tulsa control group
than in the PSID subsample. All of these differences are
highly significant.14 These results may suggest that
controls in the CAPTC experiment either were more
motivated to purchase homes or faced more favorable
housing market and housing assistance conditions than
the general US population with similar observed
characteristics. This also demonstrates the importance of
using a randomized evaluation to study the impacts of
IDAs, rather than drawing on a nonrandomized sample of
observationally equivalent households that did not
self-select into an IDA experiment.

Minimal Detectable Effects
The small sample size reduces power and makes it
challenging to find statistically significant differences,
even when effect sizes are meaningful. To illustrate this
challenge, we calculate the minimum detectable effects
for major impacts, including net worth, homeownership,
education, and business outcomes, presented in Table
3.6.

Measurement Error
A universal concern in survey-based research is the
potential deviation of given responses from the true
value. Misunderstanding of the question, data entry
errors, recall errors, and biases such as social desirability
bias can all introduce errors in measurement.
Furthermore, due to self-reporting, the data may not be a
precise measure. The CAPI and CATI systems used in data
collection included automatic range check prompts and
follow-up verification by interviewers. Though the
instruments and interview modes of ADD took steps to
minimize measurement error, it could still persist in the
data. There is no reason to believe, however, that
measurement error would correlate with treatment
assignment. Nevertheless, measurement error, even when
random, has the effect of creating noise and damping
effects that might exist.
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Table 3.6

Minimal Detectable Effects for Major Outcomes
Control proportion/
mean (SD)

Point estimate

Power

MDE (power=.80,
alpha=.10)

0.52

.03

.19

.09

6.43 (2.95)

.18

.23

.52

Appreciation rate

3,154 (7,018)

1,280

.50

1,921

Winsorized appreciation rate

2,933 (5,294)

735

.35

1,447

.12 (23)
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1.0

6.3

Expense amount

6,350 (9,577)

-532

.15

-2,400

Winsorized expense amount

4,026 (4,066)

-325

.20

-1,026

11,691 (11,700)

-1,796

.27

-4,341

8,566 (5,061)

-2,091

.87

-1,866

Any repairs

0.68

0.00

n/a

.12

Any forgone repairs

0.47

-0.03

.12

-.13

Increase in education

0.34

0.04

.22

.11

New some college

0.28

0.11

.55

.15

New college degree

0.21

-0.01

.08

.09

Enroll in class

0.46

0.06

.50

.09

New degree

0.31

0.04

.31

.09

4,501 (43,102)

-169

.10

7,749

681 (2,328)

-53

.12

419

Business ownership

0.14

-0.02

.18

.07

Any dedicated retirement savings

0.47

0.02

.12

.10

Mean value of retirement savings

5,545 (15,026)

-1,315

.31

2,855

Winsorized value of retirement savings

5,658 (9,086)

-346

.14

1,717

Untrimmed net worth

31,057 (106,816)

-1,874

.11

18,193

Net worth, robust regression

31,057 (106,816)

2,889

.13

18,193

Untrimmed total assets

93,260 (161,643)

-1,630

.10

27,340

Total assets, robust regression

93,260 (161,643)

2,362

.11

27,340

Untrimmed total debts

62,203 (97,477)

-22

.10

-16,703

Total debts, robust regression

62,203 (97,477)

1,557

.11

-16,703

Untrimmed liquid assets

3,870 (12,859)

-753

.22

2,180

Liquid assets, robust regression

3,870 (12,859)

791

.23

2,180

Untrimmed short-term debt

8,251 (26,859)

-2,132

.32

-4,551

Short-term debt, robust regression

8,251 (26,859)

-7

.10

-4,551

Homeownership
Duration of homeownership

Rate of return per year of ownership

Amount needed
Winsorized amount needed

Business equity
Winsorized business equity
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Chapter 4
Findings from the ADD4 Study
In this chapter, we present an overview of the central
results of the Tulsa ADD experiment. These are
preliminary results and are not the final findings on any
outcome. These outcomes will be explored in more detail
in future work.
For these analyses we use a consistent methodological
approach. We present bivariate and regression results
and briefly discuss the findings.

Homeownership
Homeownership was the most popular intended use of
the IDA in the CAPTC IDA program. Saving for
homeownership also received a higher match rate (2:1)
than the other qualified program uses (1:1).
Below, we evaluate the effect of treatment assignment on
homeownership using a variety of measures. First, we
examine whether treatment increased the rate of
homeownership at Wave 4. Second, we examine the
effect of treatment on duration of homeownership
between 1998 and 2008. Finally, we examine the effect of
treatment on homeownership by subgroups.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the estimates of the effect of
treatment assignment on homeownership rates at Wave
4. The effect is measured using DiD, regression, and,
because at baseline treatment group members were less
likely to own their home, regressions weighted with
propensity scores. Both the treatment and control groups
experienced large increases in homeownership between
Wave 1 and Wave 4. As presented in Table 4.1, the
homeownership rate at Wave 4 was 31 percentage points
higher than at Wave 1 for treatment group respondents
while the Wave 4 homeownership rate was 26 percentage
points higher than at Wave 1 for the control group.
Though the DiD analysis suggests a slight difference for
the full sample, regression analyses show that this is a
result of the baseline sample composition (see Table 4.2).
There was no observed significant effect of treatment on
the level of homeownership at Wave 4.

Table 4.1

Difference in Differences Analysis of Homeownership Rates
Treatment

Control

Difference

proportion

proportion

T-C

p

Homeownership among full sample (n=852)
Wave 1

0.21

0.26

-0.05

0.11

Wave 4

0.53

0.52

0.01

0.80

Wave 4-Wave 1

0.31

0.26

0.06

0.15

Homeownership among baseline owners (n=201)
Wave 1

1

1

0

Wave 4

0.79

0.77

0.02

0.78

Wave 4-Wave 1

0.79

0.77

0.02

0.78

Homeownership among baseline renters (n=651)
Wave 1

0

0

0

Wave 4

0.45

0.43

0.03

0.49

Wave 4-Wave 1

0.45

0.43

0.03

0.49

There are substantial programmatic and theoretical
reasons, though, to suspect that the effect of treatment
may not be equivalent across all subgroups in the
sample. In particular, those who rented at baseline faced
a very different set of incentives and opportunities in the
IDA program than did those who owned at baseline.
Moreover, respondents with higher incomes at baseline
may have been more able to accumulate the lump sum
needed for a down payment and closing costs. Thus,
we examine these groups separately and compare the
treatment effect between the subgroups.

Table 4.2

Regression Analysis of Homeownership Rate
Treatment effect on homeownership
N

b

S.E.

p

Full sample

823

0.03

0.03

0.39

Propensity score weighted

823

0.03

0.03

0.38

Propensity score matched

650

0.00

0.04

0.91
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Analysis of Interaction Between Treatment and
Income
In Table 4.3, we see that treatment had no impact on the
homeownership rates of baseline renters or baseline
owners, however there was a positive, significant impact
of treatment on homeownership among those with an
above-median income at baseline (about $15,480 per
year). For the above-median income group, the treatment
raised homeownership rates by about 10.6 percentage
points at Wave 4 (p<0.05), statistically significant relative
to those in the control group with above-median income.
We tested a number of other subgroup interactions.
Among the other factors tested, none interacted
significantly with treatment and are not presented here.
It is possible that the significant interaction between
baseline income and treatment reported here results
from multiple comparisons and random chance, rather
than from a real effect.

Figure 4.1

Duration of Homeownership
The impact on homeownership levels observed at Wave 3
suggests that treatment might have increased the
duration of homeownership between 1998 and 2009 for
those in the treatment group, relative to those in the
control group.
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Figure 4.1 shows the pattern of homeownership for the
treatment and control groups using information that
integrates retrospective and prospective data to estimate
homeownership in each year. Figure 4.1 shows trends in

All Control

All Treatment

Renters Control

Renters Treatment

Owners Control

Owners Treatment

Table 4.3

Subgroup Analysis of Homeownership Rates at Wave 4
Baseline owner

Treatment effect

Baseline renter

N

dF/dx [chi-sq]

p

N

dF/dx [chi-sq]

p

197

-0.01

0.86

626

0.03

0.44

[0.22]

0.83

Subsample comparison test

Median income and above

Treatment effect
Subsample comparison test

Below median income

N

dF/dx [chi-sq]

p

N

dF/dx [chi-sq]

p

413

0.11

0.04

413

-0.05

0.31

[5.76]

0.02
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homeownership for baseline owners, all respondents, and
baseline renters. Among baseline renters, we observe a
higher rate of ownership among treatment group
members in 2003, consistent with the use of incentivized
funds at the end of the program. Figure 4.1 shows,
though, that the homeownership rate of the control
group grew steadily throughout the period and that the
homeownership rate for those in the treatment group
was the same as that observed in the control group by
2004.

Table 4.4

Regression Analysis of Duration of Homeownership
Treatment effect on duration of homeownership

Full sample
Propensity score
weighted
Propensity score
matched

N

b

S.E.

p

823

0.19

0.23

0.42

823

0.18

0.23

0.43

650

0.08

0.25

0.72

analysis, which controls for initial baseline status.
We explore this dynamic in more detail by examining the
estimated duration of homeownership between 1998 and
2009, defined as the number of years in that period in
which the respondent owned a home.
Control group members averaged 4.5 years of homeownership between 1999 and 2009 whereas
treatment group members averaged 4.4 years of homeownership. The difference between the two groups is not
statistically significant. Moreover, the aggregate
comparison is biased by the higher rates of baseline
homeownership in the control group. As before, the bias
is resolved by examining trends for baseline owners and
baseline renters separately and by the use of regression

Table 4.4 presents regression analysis of the impacts of
the IDA program on the duration of homeownership.
The estimated treatment effects are in the range of about
0.1 to 0.2 years, but none of the effects are statistically
significantly different from zero.
Table 4.5 presents the impacts of IDAs on the duration of
homeownership for the same subsamples as in Table 4.3.
There was no effect of treatment on the duration of
homeownership among baseline owners or among
baseline renters. As with the analysis of the
homeownership rate at Wave 4 presented above, IDA
treatment affected duration of homeownership for

Table 4.5

Subgroup Analysis of Duration of Ownership at Wave 4
Baseline owner
N
Treatment Effect

197

Subsample Comparison Test

Baseline renter

dF/dx [chi-sq]

p

N

dF/dx [chi-sq]

p

0.35

0.41

626

0.20

0.47

[0.51]

0.33

Median income and above

Treatment Effect
Subsample Comparison Test

Below median income

N

dF/dx [chi-sq]

p

N

dF/dx [chi-sq]

p

413

0.87

0.01

413

-0.299

0.39

[1.17]

0.02

15. Where indicated, spending on home repair was winsorized at $10,000.
16. Where indicated, the cost of unmade repairs was winsorized at $15,000.
17. Where indicated, rate of home appreciation was winsorized at $25,000/year and -$25,000/year.
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value or purchase price of a bought house) and the end of
the observation period (Wave 4 home value or selling
price of a sold house), divided by the number of years in
the home during observation.

higher-income respondents relative to lower-income
respondents. The duration of homeownership for
treatment group members earning above the sample
median income was 0.87 years longer than for control
group members earning above the sample median
income, a statistically significant difference (p<.05).

Home Repair and Improvement
Treatment group members could use IDA funds at a
match rate of 1:1 to pay for improvements to home and
property that they owned. We test the effect of treatment
assignment on home repair outcomes by looking at a set
of related outcomes. We examine whether the
respondents engaged in home repair or improvement,
the amount they reported spending on those efforts,15
whether a repair was needed but unmade, and the
estimated cost of those unmade repairs. 16
Because investment in improvement and repair should
affect the value of an owned home, we also examine the
rate of home appreciation during this period.17 The rate
of home appreciation was calculated as the difference in
self-reported home value or sale price between the
beginning of the observation period (baseline home

As shown in Table 4.6, at Wave 4, about 68% of both
treatment and control group members report having
engaged in home improvement or repair costing more
than $500 since their baseline interview. The two groups
also report statistically equivalent amounts spent on
home repair and are equally likely to indicate that they
have forgone a repair that they could not afford.
However, the estimated cost of those unmade repairs
differs significantly between the two groups. Adjusting
for outlying values, the treatment group reports about
$1,500 dollars less in unmade repairs than the control
group.
We also observe a statistically significant difference in the
rate of appreciation between treatment and control group
members. Treatment group members gain $964 more in
home value per year of ownership than do control group
members.

Table 4.6

Bivariate analysis of home repair
N

Treatment

Control

Difference

mean/prptn

mean/prptn

T-C

p

Appreciation rate

367

4,829

3,057

1,772

0.08

Winsorized appreciation rate

367

3,817

2,853

964

0.09

Rate of return per year of ownership

367

25

13

12

0.36

Expense amount

440

5,938

6,557

-619

0.57

Winsorized expense amount

440

6,659

6,990

-332

0.25

Amount needed

200

9,234

11,627

-2,392

0.12

Winsorized amount needed

200

7,517

9,058

-1,541

0.03

Any repairs

443

0.68

0.69

-0.011

0.81

Any forgone repairs

443

0.48

0.47

0.01

0.77
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Table 4.7

Regression Analysis of Home Repair
Full sample

Baseline owners

N

b

S.E.

p

N

b

S.E.

p

Appreciation rate

330

1,203

1,175

0.30

138

2,102

958

0.02

Winsorized appreciation rate

330

686

631

0.14

138

1,815

852

0.02

Rate of return per year of ownership

330

26

15

0.09

138

80

49

0.11

Expense amount

394

-539

1,113

0.69

142

-1,002

1,694

0.72

Winsorized expense amount

765

-184

303

0.73

183

-380

690

0.71

Amount needed

181

-1,775

1,842

0.17

73

-1,051

5,118

0.42

Winsorized amount needed

191

-2,077

802

0.01

75

-558

2072

0.39

Any repairs

395

0.02

0.24

0.53

125

-0.45

0.64

0.76

Any forgone repairs

395

-0.13

0.23

0.29

137

-1.33

0.51

0.01

Treatment effect on…

These outcomes were explored further using regression
analysis. As shown in Table 4.7, the regression analyses
largely confirm the pattern of results observed in the
descriptive statistics. There is no difference between the
treatment conditions in terms of the presence of repairs,
or the amount spent on repairs. As above, treatment
group members in the full sample, though no more likely
to report unmade repairs, reported that the cost of those
unmade repairs was significantly lower. However, whereas
we observed a difference in appreciation rate in the
bivariate analysis, the regression analysis finds no
significant difference in appreciation for the full sample.
Because baseline owners may have been more likely than
baseline renters to invest in home repair, we also
analyzed that subsample as part of the regression
analysis. When examining home repair outcomes among
those who owned their home at baseline, several
interesting findings emerge. Among baseline owners,
those in the treatment group were significantly less likely
to report needed repairs they could not afford. Baseline
owners in the treatment group also enjoyed a significantly higher rate of appreciation than did members of the
control group.

Table 4.8

Bivariate Analysis of Education Outcomes
N

Treat

Cont

Diff

prptn

prptn

T-C

p

Baseline
Less than HS

824

0.07

0.07

0.01

0.70

HS degree

824

0.26

0.25

0.01

0.86

Some college

824

0.41

0.42

-0.01

0.70

College grad or more

824

0.26

0.26

0

0.98

Less than HS

824

0.08

0.07

0.01

0.69

HS degree

824

0.20

0.20

0

0.93

Some college

824

0.37

0.33

0.03

0.32

College grad or more

824

0.35

0.39

-0.04

0.26

Enrolled in new course

824

0.52

0.45

0.06

0.06

New degree from course

824

0.35

0.30

0.04

0.18

Increase in degree level

707

0.39

0.35

0.04

0.33

New HS degree

824

0.24

0.29

-0.04

0.70

New some college

824

0.35

0.28

0.07

0.23

New college grad

824

0.20

0.21

-0.01

0.76

Enrolled in job training

824

0.24

0.26

-0.02

0.43

Completed job training

824

0.22

0.25

-0.03

0.34

Outcome
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Education
As shown in Table 4.8, at baseline, the treatment and
comparison groups are well-matched with respect to
education level. A plurality of participants (a bit more
than 40% in both groups) report that they have some
college education, but not a college degree. About onequarter of participants in both groups report having only
a high school diploma, while another quarter report that
they have a college degree. Only a small percentage
(7% in each group) report that they did not complete
high school.
At Wave 4, the distribution of educational achievement is
changed slightly, due to a greater proportion of respondents reporting higher levels of education. The proportion
of respondents without a high school degree is essentially unchanged, while the proportions with a high school
degree or with some college are lower at Wave 4 than at
Wave 1. The individuals who exited these categories
seem to have moved into the college graduate category,
which is the only category for which the proportion is
higher at Wave 4 than at baseline. The treatment and
control groups did not differ significantly on educational
attainment at any level.
In addition to comparing the distribution of education
level at Wave 4, we explore several other outcomes. The
first is whether respondents enrolled in an education
program at any point since baseline. A larger proportion
of treatment group members than control group
members enrolled in such a program, and this difference
was significant. In addition, we compare treatment
groups on their receipt of a degree from an education
program since baseline. About 30% of both groups
reported receiving a degree, and there was no statistically
significant difference between the two groups.
In addition to measuring whether respondents received a
degree, we assessed whether they reported an increased
educational level on the categorical measure of education. By this measure, around 35% of the control group
and 39% of the treatment group increased their education. The treatment and control groups did not differ

significantly from one another on this outcome. In order
to better understand the experience of those participants
who increased their education, we created a series of
variables to indicate whether a respondent had achieved a
high school diploma, some college, or a college degree
Table 4.9

Propensity Score Weighted Regression Analysis of
Education Outcomes
Treatment effect on…

N

dF/dx

S.E.

p

Increase in education

548

0.04

0.04

0.37

New some college

267

0.11

0.06

0.09

New college degree

609

-0.01

0.02

0.69

Enroll in class

824

0.06

0.04

0.09

New degree

824

0.04

0.03

0.23

since baseline. Each of these variables is only created for
those respondents who had a lower level of education at
baseline, reducing the sample size for the analyses of
these variables. It is possible for a respondent to be
coded as having achieved more than one type of
additional education. For example, if an individual had a
high school diploma at baseline, but was able to earn a
college degree over the course of the study period, he
would be coded as having newly earned both ‘some
college’ and a college degree. The proportion of
treatment and control groups achieving each kind of new
education are roughly the same, except for a higher
proportion of treatment group members achieving some
college. Bivariate analyses of these variables show no
difference between the two treatment groups.
To further explore the potential relationship between
treatment and educational outcomes, we conducted
marginal effects probit regression analyses predicting
outcomes from treatment assignment while controlling
for a variety of covariates.
Table 4.9 shows the treatment effect as the marginal
difference between treatment and control. It is interpreted
as the difference between the proportion of treatment
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no evidence of a positive treatment effect.

group and control group members achieving the
outcome.

There is reason to believe that treatment may have
differential impacts on certain subsamples of respondents. To explore this possibility, we examined the
treatment effect separately for subsamples based on
gender, income, and whether the respondent was banked
at baseline. We did so for three major outcomes:
enrollment in an educational program, receipt of a
degree, and increased education. Marginal effects probit
models were used to estimate treatment effects. Table
4.10 presents results of these analyses. For each
subsample we present the estimated treatment effect.

We observe a small but significant effect of treatment on
the likelihood that a respondent enrolled in an education
program (p<0.10). However, there is no significant impact
on the likelihood of earning a degree, or on the likelihood
of increasing education level. When examining the
estimated effect of treatment on the likelihood of gaining
certain levels of education, we find that there is a
marginally significant impact on the likelihood of gaining
‘some college’ during the study period, but not on the
likelihood of earning a college degree. Due to small
sample size, the few respondents who earned a high
school degree during the study period are not analyzed.
Finally, with regard to the job training outcomes, there is

Subsample on Gender
With regard to subsamples based on gender, men

Table 4.10

Subgroup Analysis of Education Outcomes
Acquired degree or certificate
from school

Enrolled in school
Female (n=659)

Male (n=152)

Female (n=659)

Male (n=145)

Increased education level
Female (n=435)

Male (n=110)

dF/dx
[chi-sq]

p

dF/dx

p

dF/dx
[chi-sq]

p

dF/dx

p

dF/dx
[chi-sq]

p

dF/dx

p

Treatment effect

0.06

0.16

0.20

0.04

0.03

0.46

0.14

0.05

-0.03

0.55

0.43

0.01

Subsample
comparison test

[2.08]

0.15

[4.57]

0.03

[18.20]

0.00

R < median
income (n=400)

R > median
income (n=424)

R < median
income (n=400)

R > median
income (n=424)

R < median income (n=284)

R > median
income (n=264)

dF/dx
[chi-sq]

p

dF/dx

p

dF/dx
[chi-sq]

p

dF/dx

p

dF/dx
[chi-sq]

p

dF/dx

p

Treatment effect

0.06

0.27

0.02

0.76

0.08

0.10

-0.02

0.64

0.09

0.16

0.01

0.89

Subsample
comparison test

[0.34]

0.56

[2.38]

0.12

[0.86]

0.35

Banked
(n=697)

Not banked
(n=126)

Banked
(n=697)

Not banked
(n=113)

Banked
(n=449)

Not banked
(n=82)

dF/dx
[chi-sq]

p

dF/dx

p

dF/dx
[chi-sq]

p

dF/dx

p

dF/dx
[chi-sq]

p

dF/dx

p

Treatment effect

0.06

0.19

0.20

0.18

0.03

0.20

0.22

0.02

0.06

0.23

0.02

0.90

Subsample
comparison test

[1.14]

0.29

[4.67]

0.03

[0.05]

0.83
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experience a larger effect of treatment on education
outcomes than women. For the likelihood of enrollment
in school, the treatment effect for men (dF/Dx=0.20,
p<0.05) is much larger than that for women (dF/Dx=0.06,
p>0.10). Nevertheless, the post-test of the difference
between the two treatment effects was not significant. In
the case of the receipt of degree outcome, the treatment
effect once again differs by gender, showing a large and
significant impact for men (dF/Dx=0.14, p<0.10), and a
smaller impact for women (dF/Dx=0.03, p=0.46). In this
case, the treatment effect for women is not statistically
significant, and the comparison between the two
treatment effects revealed that they are significantly
different from one another (p<0.05). In our examination
of the increased education outcome, the pattern is
repeated: men experience a large and significant impact
(dF/Dx=0.43, p<0.01), while the treatment effect for
women is non-significant (dF/Dx= -0.03, p=0.55), and
these treatment effects are significantly different
(p<0.01).

Subsample on Income
A similar set of subsample analyses were conducted for
groups divided by income level at baseline. Specifically,
we compared treatment effects on those who earned the
median income or more at baseline, and those who made
less. For the enrollment outcome, the treatment effect is
not significant for either group. For the degree outcome,
there is no effect of treatment on those with belowmedian income or those with higher incomes. A similar
pattern was seen with regard to the increased education
outcome. There is no significant effect of treatment on
higher-income respondents or on those with belowmedian incomes. The treatment effect comparison tests
for both the degree and increased education outcomes
were non-significant.
Subsample on Banked and Unbanked
Finally, we analyzed subsamples composed of those who
were banked and unbanked at baseline. For the enrollment outcome, there is not a significant impact on either

Table 4.11

Bivariate Analysis of Business Ownership
Treatment

Control

Difference

p

N

mean/proportion

mean/proportion

T-C

Business equity

845

7,365

4,204

3,161

0.32

Winsorized business equity

845

741

664

76

0.64

Number of part-time employees

854

0.04

0.08

-0.04

0.16

Number of full-time employees

854

0.07

0.08

-0.01

0.72

Age of the business

120

10.19

9.75

0.43

0.80

Business ownership

855

0.13

0.13

0.00

0.89

Table 4.12

Regression Analysis of Business Ownership
Full sample
Treament effect on…

Wave 4 business owners

N

b

S.E.

p

N

b

S.E.

p

Business equity

760

-169

2,735

0.95

97

6,094

24,729

0.81

Winsorized business equity

760

-53

169

0.75

97

830

1,082

0.45

Business ownership

760

-0.13

0.13

0.40

*Where noted, business equity is winsorized at $10,000.
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the banked (dF/Dx=0.06, p>0.10) or unbanked (dF/
Dx=0.20, p>0.10). Although the treatment effect for the
unbanked is much larger than that for the banked
respondents, the post-test comparing treatment effects
was not significant. An even more pronounced difference
was visible with regard to the degree attainment
outcome. Banked respondents did not experience a
significant treatment effect, while unbanked respondents
had a large and significant treatment effect (dF/Dx=0.22,
p<0.10). Post-testing indicated that the difference
between the two treatment effects was significant. For
the increased education outcome, however, the pattern is
not repeated. There is no significant treatment effect on
either the banked or unbanked subsamples, and the
difference between the two was also not significant.

Business Ownership and Equity
At baseline, about 7% of the sample reported owning a
business. While this proportion substantially increased
Table 4.13

Bivariate Analysis of Retirement Savings
N

Treat

Cont

Diff

mean/
prptn

mean/
prptn

T-C

p

Any dedicated
retirement savings

853

0.44

0.42

0.03

0.48

Mean value of
retirement savings

785

4,836

5,500

-664

0.56

Winsorized mean
value of
retirement savings

785

3,559

3,795

-236

0.66

between baseline and Wave 4 (13% of respondents own
a business at Wave 4), there was no significant effect of
treatment on business ownership at Wave 4.
In Table 4.11, we see that about 13% of each group
owned a business at Wave 4. We also find that while the
treatment group had $3,161 more in business equity,

Table 4.14

Regressions for Retirement Savings
Treatment effect on…

N

b

S.E.

p

Any dedicated retirement savings

687

0.11

0.17

0.52

Mean value of retirement savings

687

-1,315

1,131

0.25

Winsorized mean value of retirement savings

687

-346

504

0.49

after adjusting for outliers18 and looking at the full
sample, there was no difference in business equity
between treatment and control group members. The
regression analyses presented in Table 4.12 confirm the
findings from the descriptive analyses; control and
treatment group members do not differ with respect
to business.

Retirement Savings
One qualified use of IDA savings was to roll the funds
over into an IRA account. For participants who used their
savings for contributing to their retirement account,
which was the third most common savings goal among
IDA account holders, participants were given a 1:1 match.
To assess the impact of IDA participation on retirement
savings 6 years after program completion, we compared
treatment and control group members on both the
presence and value of retirement savings.19
As shown in Table 4.13, bivariate comparisons did not
reveal statistically significant differences between the two
groups with regard to retirement savings outcomes.
Slightly more than 40% of both groups reported having
dedicated retirement savings such as IRAs and 401(k)s.
The value of these savings was roughly $5,000 for both
groups, although this amount was closer to $4,000 once
we adjusted for extreme values.
These results were further explored using regression
analysis and controlling for relevant covariates (see Table

19. Where noted, the value of retirement savings is winsorized at $25,000.
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Figure 4.2

Distribution of Selected Wealth Variables, Change from
1998/99 to 2008/09

4.14). Regression analyses did not detect significant
differences between groups. It is important to note,
however, that these analyses are based on self-reported
data about dedicated retirement accounts. Thus, the data
do not reflect savings that may be intended for use
during retirement but which are saved in other ways, for
instance, long-term retirement savings that may be held
in a general savings account. Furthermore, due to
self-reporting, the data may not be a precise measure
of the actual value of retirement accounts.

Wealth, Assets, and Liabilities
One of the long-term impacts of interest is the impact of
Tulsa IDAs on wealth accumulation. The study of net
worth is frequently hampered by methodological
challenges. Our analysis attempts to address some of
these issues including item-missing data, outliers, and
heteroskedasticity. In this section, we present findings on
five wealth outcomes: net worth, total assets, total debt,
liquid assets, and short-term debt. Because value can be
shuffled among these, our key outcome in this analysis is
net worth.

Figure 4.2 shows box plots of each outcome for all
respondents. Box plots show the dispersion of the
variables and are useful in the identification of outliers.
For each variable, shown here as change in value between Wave 1 and Wave 4, the box plot shows five distributional characteristics. The box itself represents the location of the 25th percentile (bottom of the box) and the
75th
percentile (the top of the box). The line inside the box is
the median. The braces beyond the box extend 1.5 times
the interquartile range (distance between the 25th and
75th percentile in each direction) and data outside of the
braces are indicated by dots. As in all other wealth data,
our wealth outcomes are characterized by fairly compact
interquartile ranges, low medians, skewed distributions,
and large numbers of extreme outliers.
Because of the large number of outliers, concerns arise
about the influence of outlying cases on our estimates of
the treatment effect. In the analyses below, we attempt to
reduce the influence of outlying cases through the use of
symmetrical trimming and robust regression. We also
show findings with multiple approaches to item-missing
data. As discussed above, net worth measures are
comprised of variables gauging the level of assets and
debt (33 in total). A large portion of Wave 4 respondents
are missing information on at least one of these 33
measures. Consequently, data are imputed using multiple
imputations through chained equations. The creation and
analysis of implicates allows us to incorporate into our
analyses the characteristics of those who are dropped by
listwise deletion. Data are imputed for each item and
aggregated variables are regenerated in each implicate.
Table 4.15 shows the results of the regressions, using
listwise deletion. The results above demonstrate the
challenges of inference on a variable with the characteristics of our wealth measures. First, in this version,
because we trim on extreme changes from Wave 1 to
Wave 4 in the outcome variable, different cases are
trimmed in each analysis. In addition, results are
inconsistent between different trim levels and between
trimmed and robust regressions. Significance level,
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Table 4.15

Regression Analysis of Wealth Outcomes, Unimputed Data
Untrimmed
b/se
p
Net worth
Treatment
N
Total assets
Treatment
N
Total debts
Treatment
N
Liquid assets
Treatment
N
Short-term debt
Treatment
N

2.5 % on W4- W1 extremes
b/se
p

5% on W4-W1 extremes
b/se
p

Robust regressions
b/se
p

-9209
[12,569]
348

0.46

-6,423
[5,400]
330

0.24

-1,316
[4,341]
312

0.76

-3,670
[3,863]
348

0.34

2,268
[16,122]
447

0.89

5,898
[7,291]
423

0.42

7,493
[6,246]
401

0.23

7,674
[5,781]
447

0.19

-2,145
[7,128]
657

0.76

-71
[4,170]
623

0.99

598
[3,740]
591

0.87

573
[3,619]
657

0.87

-724
[842]
748

0.39

-234
[265]
710

0.38

-223
[187]
672

0.23

98
[52]
748

0.06

-748
[1,426]
745

0.60

1,103
[543]
706

0.04

489
[443]
669

0.27

175
[318]
745

0.58

Table 4.16

Regression Analysis of Wealth Outcomes, Imputed Data
Untrimmed

2.5 % on W4- W1 extremes

5% on W4-W1 extremes

Robust regressions

b/se

p

b/se

p

b/se

p

b/se

p

-1,874

0.80

2,439

0.49

3,819

0.19

2,889

0.30

Net worth
Treatment
N

[7,310]

[3,478]

[2,904]

[2,747]

855

810

763

855

Total assets
Treatment
N

-1,630

0.87

2,565

0.64

-800

0.86

2,362

[10,231]

[5,460]

[4,600]

[4,546]

855

808

765

855

0.60

Total debts
Treatment
N

-22

0.99

909

0.81

1,849

0.59

1,557

[6,185]

[3,866]

[3,434]

[3,365]

855

809

765

855

0.64

Liquid assets
Treatment
N

-753

0.33

-259

0.30

-212

0.22

79

[765]

[245]

[172]

[47]

855

810

766

855

0.10

Short-term debt
Treatment
N

-2,132

0.12

369

0.31

-75

0.77

-7

[1,384]

[362]

[251]

[64]

855

810

764

855

0.92
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magnitude of impact, and even sign direction of the
impact all change between analyses. Even after trimming,
large magnitudes of impact are insignificant because of
the size of the standard errors. This leads to results that
are hard to interpret. The top line result is large and
negative. Given this we expect, at the mean, for the point
estimates of the effect on total debt to be larger than the

Table 4.17

Bivariate Analysis of Psychological Outcomes
N

Treatment

Control

Diff

mean

mean

T-C

p

substantially but non-significantly increasing both. There
is a marginally significant but economically small effect of
treatment on liquid assets. Assignment to treatment is
associated with $79 more in liquid assets, relative to the
control group.
Using the imputed data the results at each level of trim
are more internally consistent. It is also worth noting that,
while nothing approaches conventional levels of significance, the sign of the treatment effect on net worth is
positive at higher levels of trim. Still, given our findings in
the full case data and incorporating methods to correct
for missing data and distributional problems, there is no
evidence of a treatment effect on wealth after 10 years.

CES-D 10

817

7.41

6.69

0.722

0.10

Zimbardo

817

1.19

1.18

0.004

0.87

Psychological Outcomes

Stress

817

23.51

23.25

0.260

0.63

The Wave 4 survey included several standardized scales
of psychological outcomes including depressive
symptoms, stress, and future orientation. These measures
are new and were not included at baseline. At Wave 4,
depressive symptoms were measured with the Center for
Epidemiological Studies Depression 10-item scale
(CES-D-10), stress was measured with questions
developed by Cohen, Kamarck, and Mermelstein, and
future orientation was measured with the Zimbardo scale
(Andresen, Malmgren, Carter & Patrick, 1994; Cohen,
Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2003).

Table 4.18

Regression Analysis of Psychological Outcomes
Treatment effect on…
CES-D 10

N

b

S.E.

p

817

0.62

0.44

0.16

Zimbardo

817

0.00

0.03

0.17

Stress

817

0.22

0.54

0.68

effect on total assets. Instead, we find the opposite. We
suspect that missing data contribute substantially to this
finding. Notice that the sample size changes between
analyses. This is because different respondents are
missing on different outcome variables. We address this
here through the use of imputation.
Looking at the impacts on the indicators of wealth in
Table 4.16, the results are mixed. After adjusting for
outliers, there is a moderate but non-significant effect of
treatment on net worth (in robust regressions, $2,889,
p=0.30). We observe a similarly large impact on total
assets and total debts, with assignment to treatment

In the descriptive statistics, we observe no significant
differences between the two groups with respect to these
outcomes. The groups are markedly similar on the
frequency of depressive symptoms, their future
orientation, and their level of stress. This pattern of
results was confirmed in regression analysis presented in
Table 4.18.

Health and Use of Tobacco and Alcohol
The Wave 4 survey instrument included questions about
the health of respondents and use of tobacco and
alcohol. The health outcomes include body mass index
(BMI), self-assessment of health, and measures of

20. Where noted, total monthly household income, 2007 household income, and monthly income from work are winsorized at $5,000, $60,000, and
$5,000, respectively.
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Table 4.19

Bivariate Analysis of Health and Substance Use Outcomes
Treatment

Control

Difference

p

N

mean/prptn

mean/prptn

T-C

Body mass index
Health relative to others your age (higher scores indicate poorer health)

798
798

30.52
1.71

30.34
1.69

0.18
0.02

0.75
0.80

Health is poor or fair relative to others my age (dichotomous)

798

0.22

0.19

0.03

0.30

Pain interferes with normal work (higher scores indicate more interference)

798

1.19

1.07

0.11

0.18

Pain interferes with work not at all (dichotomous)
Pain interferes with work quite a bit or extremely (dichotomous)
Health limits moderate activities a lot
Health limits ability to climb stairs a lot

798
798
798
798

0.39
0.17
0.10
0.12

0.40
0.13
0.10
0.15

-0.01
0.04
0.00
-0.03

0.82
0.14
0.98
0.27

Medical expenses in the past year ($)

798

1,222

1,132

90

0.57

Medical expenses in the past year, winsorized

798

848

878

-30

0.69

Drinks 2-3x per week or more

812

0.10

0.11

-0.01

0.48

Binge drinks monthly or more
Alcohol screen score (range 0-12)
Meets alcohol screen threshold for brief intervention

812
812
812

0.07
1.41
0.12

0.09
1.58
0.13

-0.02
-0.17
-0.01

0.24
0.25
0.67

812
812

0.33
22.33

0.32
23.08

0.01
-0.75

0.58
0.82

Drinking behavior

Smoking behavior
Smoked in the last 30 days
Number of cigarettes smoked in past week

Table 4.20

Regression Analysis of Health and Substance Use Outcomes
N

b/OR

S.E.

p

Body mass index

798

0.00

0.54

0.99

Health relative to others your age (higher scores indicate poorer health)

798

0.02

0.07

0.78

Health is poor or fair relative to others my age (dichotomous)
Pain interferes with normal work (higher scores indicate more interference)
Pain interferes with work not at all (dichotomous)

798
798
798

1.19
0.10
0.98

0.23
0.08
0.15

0.36
0.23
0.77

798

1.34

0.29

0.18

798
798

0.90
0.78

0.24
0.18

0.68
0.29

798
798

72.77
-25.25

158.96
72.66

0.65
0.73

Drinks 2-3x per week or more
Binge drinks monthly or more

812

0.94

0.24

0.81

Alcohol screen score (range 0-12)

812

0.76

0.23

0.36

812

-0.12

0.14

0.42

812

0.99

0.23

0.96

812
812

1.17
0.22

0.19
3.24

0.35
0.95

Pain interferes with work quite a bit or extremely (dichotomous)
Health limits moderate activities a lot
Health limits ability to climb stairs a lot
Medical expenses in the past year ($)
Medical expenses in the past year, winsorized
Drinking behavior

Meets alcohol screen threshold for brief intervention
Smoking behavior
Smoked in the last 30 days
Number of cigarettes smoked in past week
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Table 4.21

Bivariate Analysis of Employment and Income Outcomes
Treatment

Control

Difference

p

N

mean/proportion

mean/proportion

T-C

Total household income (monthly)

786

2,955

3,079

-124

0.49

Winsorized total household income (monthly)

786

2,586

2,678

-92

0.38

2007 household income (annual)

794

35,431

35,485

-53

0.98

Winsorized 2007 household income (annual)

794

30,690

31,659

-970

0.44

Income from work (monthly)

814

2,398

2,573

-175

0.31

Winsorized income from work (monthly)

814

2,144

2,251

-107

0.35

Proportion employed FT/PT/self

855

0.78

0.80

-0.01

0.70

Proportion with 2+ jobs

855

0.14

0.21

-0.06

0.02

Table 4.22

Regression Analysis of Employment and Income Outcomes
N

b

S.E.

p

Total household income (monthly)

713

-180

176

0.31

Winsorized total household income (monthly)

713

-108

100

0.28

2007 household income (annual)

714

-905

2,123

0.67

Winsorized 2007 household income (annual)

714

-1,224

1,207

0.31

Income from work (monthly)

732

-262

164

0.11

Winsorized income from work (monthly)

732

-145

106

0.17

Proportion employed FT/PT/self

768

-0.09

0.20

0.65

Proportion with 2+ jobs

768

-0.06

0.21

0.01

Treament effect on…

limitations imposed by health. Substance use questions
gauged the frequency of respondent’s use of alcohol and
tobacco products.
As shown in Table 4.19, among respondents in the
treatment and control groups, the mean body mass was
over 30, the cut-off for obesity used by the NIH. Still the
majority of those in both groups consider themselves in
good health generally and among those their age. Few
respondents in either group report restrictions on activity
from poor health. Fewer than 10% of respondents binge
drink monthly and few meet the criteria for problem

drinking. About one in three respondents report having
used tobacco in the past month. In bivariate analysis, we
observe no statistically significant difference between the
two groups on health and substance abuse measures.
In regression analysis, we observe no difference between
the treatment and control groups on health and substance use outcomes. Similarly we find that those from
the treatment group incur major medical expenses at the
same level as those in the control group.
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Table 4.23

Bivariate Analysis of Economic Hardship
Treatment

Control

Difference

p

N

mean/ prptn

mean/ prptn

T-C

Rent or mortgage

812

0.31

0.29

0.03

0.43

Medical care

812

0.37

0.34

0.03

0.40

Dental care

812

0.44

0.38

0.06

0.09

Prescription medication

812

0.36

0.31

0.05

0.12

Difficulty paying any of the above

812

0.62

0.61

0.01

0.70

Count of types of bills had difficulty paying (of 4)

812

1.49

1.33

0.16

0.09

Financial situation has worsened since last interview

812

0.32

0.26

0.06

0.08

Financial situation has improved since last interview

812

0.41

0.43

-0.02

0.57

Felt it was hard or very hard to make ends meet

812

0.59

0.57

0.02

0.57

Sometimes or often did not have enough to eat in past 4 months

812

0.12

0.11

0.01

0.63

Difficulty Paying Bills in Past Year

Change in financial situation since last interview

Table 4.24

Regression Analysis of Economic Hardship
N

b/OR

S.E.

p

Rent or mortgage

812

1.11

0.19

0.53

Medical care

812

1.08

0.17

0.62

Dental care

812

1.26

0.20

0.13

Prescription medication

812

1.26

0.20

0.16

Difficulty paying any of the above

812

1.01

0.16

0.93

Count of types of bills had difficulty paying (of 4), OLS

812

0.13

0.10

0.16

Count of types of bills had difficulty paying (of 4), Poisson

812

0.09

0.06

0.12

Financial situation has worsened since last interview

812

1.23

0.20

0.22

Financial situation has improved since last interview

812

0.93

0.14

0.61

Felt it was hard or very hard to make ends meet

812

1.06

0.17

0.70

Sometimes or often did not have enough to eat in past 4 months

812

1.08

0.25

0.76

Difficulty Paying Bills in Past Year

Change in financial situation since last interview

21. Where noted, amount owed on mortgages is winsorized at $150,000.
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Employment and Wages

group members are, however, less likely to be working
multiple jobs at Wave 4. Both groups report, after
adjusting for outliers, about $2,600 per month in total pre
-tax household income (in the survey month) from all
sources. For the year prior to the survey, the treatment
and control groups, on average, report a statistically
identical yearly income of about $31,000. Both the

At Wave 4, respondents were asked detailed questions
about their current employment and earnings. As shown
in Table 4.21, there is no significant difference between
treatment and control group members at Wave 4 with
respect to employment rate or earnings. 20 Treatment

Table 4.25

Bivariate Analysis of Loan Characteristics and Performance
Full sample
Treat

Cont

Baseline renters
Diff

Treat

Cont

Diff

N

mean/
prptn

mean/
prptn

T-C

0.27

621

40,406

32,425

7,982

0.15

2,953

0.37

621

33,756

29,247

4,509

0.24

-1

0.98

243

798

764

33

0.54

6.41

0.05

0.86

211

6.60

6.47

0.14

0.67

0.44

0

0.99

642

0.40

0.38

0.02

0.69

0.90

0.91

-0.01

0.72

242

0.91

0.95

-0.04

0.25

367

0.30

0.26

0.04

0.40

251

0.27

0.18

0.09

0.11

366

0.35

0.32

0.03

0.61

251

0.36

0.33

0.03

0.63

Ever 90 days late

365

0.14

0.07

0.07

0.04

249

0.15

0.07

0.07

0.06

Ever foreclosed upon

855

0.03

0.03

0

0.58

652

0.03

0.02

0

0.94

N

mean/
prptn

mean/
prptn

T-C

Amount owed on mortgages

805

39,346

34,183

5,162

Winsorized amount owed on mortgages

805

33,719

30,766

Monthly mortgage payment

315

765

766

Rate of primary mortgage

272

6.46

Have mortgage

839

0.44

Is primary mortgage fixed rate

317

Ever refinanced
Ever 30 days late

p

p

Table 4.26

Regression Analysis of Loan Characteristics and Performance
Full sample
Treatment effect on…

Baseline renters

N

b

S.E.

p

N

b

S.E.

p

Amount owed on mortgages

727

-387

4,328

0.93

556

1,842

5,164

0.72

Winsorized amount owed on mortgages

727

174

3,269

0.96

556

1,846

3,821

0.63

Monthly mortgage payment

279

-30

54

0.58

213

17

63

0.79

Rate of primary mortgage

240

-0.03

0.32

0.93

184

0.01

0.39

0.98

Have mortgage

755

0.01

0.16

0.97

573

-0.01

0.19

0.98

Is primary mortgage fixed rate

281

0.24

0.58

0.68

201

-0.38

0.81

0.64

Ever refinanced

326

0.16

0.29

0.59

220

0.48

0.46

0.30

Ever 30 days late

325

-0.17

0.29

0.56

220

-0.29

0.39

0.46

Ever 90 days late

307

0.58

0.46

0.21

213

0.97

0.67

0.15
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treatment and control group accrue most of their income
from work. In addition 14% of treatment group members
report working multiple jobs as compared to 21% of control group members.
Regression analysis, shown in Table 4.22, confirms the
descriptive results and finds that treatment assignment
significantly reduces the odds of holding multiple jobs at
Wave 4. Earnings and employment rate, however, were
not statistically different between treatment and control
members at Wave 4.

Material Hardship
At Wave 4, study participants were asked if they
experienced a range of material hardship as well as their
perception of their financial situation at the time of their
interview. About 6 in 10 respondents in both groups
reported being unable to pay at least one bill during the
year prior to their Wave 4 interview (see Table 4.23). For
both the treatment and control groups, more
respondents reported being unable to pay a dental bill
than any other. About 30% of respondents in each group
reported having missed a rent or mortgage payment.
Slightly more than 10% reported experiencing food
insecurity in the 4 months prior to their interview.
Still, a plurality of both groups reported that their
financial situation had improved since their last ADD
interview. In bivariate and regression analyses, no
differences between treatment and control group
members were observed.

owed money on a mortgage at Wave 4. As shown in
Table 4.25, in bivariate analyses, there were no significant
differences on presence of a mortgage or outstanding
mortgage debt between the treatment and control
groups. The terms of the primary loans held by members
of each group were not statistically different. About 90%
of each group had a fixed rate loan and the average
interest rate for both groups was about 6.4%.
While there was no difference in the proportion of each
group who had ever been 30 days late on mortgage
payments, in bivariate analysis, those in the treatment
group were significantly more likely to have experienced
90-day delinquency than members of the control group.
Because many of the primary loans held by baseline
owners were originated before the start of the CAPTC IDA
program, we examine the loans held by baseline renters
separately. From bivariate analysis of baseline renters, we
note that those in the treatment group are more likely to
have been 90-days delinquent.
The patterns of association between loan characteristics
and performance and treatment assignment seen in
bivariate analysis are also seen when the data are
examined using regression techniques (see Table 4.26).
We find no difference between the treatment and control
groups on loan characteristics and loan performance
among the full sample or among baseline renters.

Loan Terms and Performance
Respondents who had mortgage debt at Wave 4 were
asked about the characteristics of the mortgage(s) they
held at the time of the interview. Below, we report
findings on the characteristics of the loan with the largest
value held by respondents.21 In addition, we report on
loan performance characteristics including refinancing,
30-day delinquency, 90-day delinquency and foreclosure.
About 44% of both the treatment and control group
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The ADD4 study provides the first empirical evidence
from a randomized, longitudinal experiment on the
long-term impacts of a short-term IDA program on
economic, psychological, and health outcomes among
low-income families. The fourth wave of data for the ADD
experiment was collected from treatment and control
group members about 6 years after program completion
and 10 years after random assignment. This follow-up
provides policy makers and practitioners the opportunity
to examine impacts of an IDA program on asset building,
years after the savings program has ended.
Below we present a summary of results on the five key
allowable uses of IDAs: homeownership, home
maintenance and repair, post-secondary education,
business and retirement savings. We also summarize the
results for net worth.

Homeownership
The treatment and control groups both experienced
substantial and ongoing increases in homeownership
rates over the 10-year study period (1998 to 2008). The
rates of increase in homeownership for the ADD4 sample
are high compared with the homeownership rate for the
nationally representative PSID survey sample (GrinsteinWeiss, Sherraden, Gale, Rohe, Schreiner, & Key, 2011).
The increased homeownership rate is especially notable
given the broader economic crisis gripping the nation in
the later years of the study period.
Participation in the Tulsa IDA program, however, did not
result in a significantly higher homeownership rate 10
years after the program began. Earlier findings (Grinstein
-Weiss et al., 2008; Mills, Gale, et al., 2008) showed a
statistically significant programmatic effect on homeownership rates among baseline renters as of 2003. The
longer-term findings show that assignment to the IDA
program may have accelerated the onset of homeownership for treatment group households, but in the
long run, it did not result in a homeownership rate
statistically different from the control group. The gap in
the homeownership rate between the treatment and
control groups narrowed rapidly after the program

ended in 2003. Thus, the IDA program did not result in a
significant increase in the homeownership rate 10 years
after it began, nor did it increase the duration of homeownership during that time.
For the subgroup of people with above-sample median
annual incomes at baseline (about $15,500 per year),

assignment to the treatment group significantly
increased the homeownership rate and duration of
homeownership. This may indicate that while IDA
programs are not effective in promoting homeownership
among very-low-income households, they may be
effective for households with higher, although still
modest, levels of income. It should be noted, however,
that subgroup analysis was conducted on 11 dependent
variables and only income was significant. Thus, it is
possible that this finding is the result of chance. If the
income and homeownership result is not due to chance,
then it may be that IDA programs should target those
participants with somewhat higher incomes for homeownership, which is a major financial and practical
undertaking, and steer very-low-income participants
toward other assets such as education, which may be less
of a financial challenge.
In addition, given the economic climate and changes that
occurred in the housing market during the study period,
including the expansion of sub-prime lending, it is
important to note that the vast majority of treatment and
control group members with housing financing received
fixed-rate mortgages, with relatively low interest rates.
The lack of statistically significant effect of the IDA
program on the full sample of program participants might
be due to several factors. First, housing prices in the Tulsa
area were relatively affordable during the study period.
The median home value in 2001 was about $111,000, well
below the national median. Thus, buying a home in Tulsa
was relatively easy compared to many housing markets,
making the IDA program less important in buying a
home. Second, other Tulsa area homebuyer assistance
programs were available for control group members. At
least one of those programs provided down-payment
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assistance and homeownership counseling without the
savings requirement. Also, as presented above, both
groups appear to have received good quality loans.

could be the result of the homeownership counseling and
training courses required of program participants
intending to use their matched savings to buy homes.

IDA programs may be more effective in assisting lowincome households purchasing homes in higher cost
housing markets and/or in markets where there are fewer
alternative sources of mortgage assistance and homeownership training.

Education

Over two-thirds of homeowners, both treatment and
control group members, reported making home repairs
over $500 during the 10-year study period. For the full
sample, there was no impact of the treatment on home
repairs, on the dollar amount spent on repairs, or on
housing price appreciation. However, treatment group
members did report that the estimated cost of unmade
repairs was significantly lower compared with the control
group members.

Among treatment group members present at Wave 4, a
small percentage (8.3%) planned to save for education
expenses. Among all the matched withdrawals made,
6.9% were put toward education uses. Despite such a
small group saving for education, we find a significant
impact on education enrollment 10 years after baseline
assignment (6 years after program completion). The
enrollment results are similar to results from learn$ave, a
randomized IDA experiment in Canada (N=3,584), which
finds a significant treatment effect on enrollment in
community college and university programs six months
after the program ended (Leckie et al., 2010). In ADD4, we
also find a significant impact on the likelihood of gaining
“some college” education among treatment group
members compared to the control group.

Moreover, among baseline homeowners, we find that two
of the five measured effects of the IDA on home
maintenance and repair yielded significant and
economically meaningful results. Treatment group homeowners were less likely to report skipping needed home
repairs and had a higher rate of housing price
appreciation during the program period than control
group homeowners. These findings suggest that being
assigned to the IDA intervention may have helped those
who owned their homes at the start of the IDA program
to maintain and improve their homes over the 10-year
study period, and to experience a greater increase in
housing price appreciation.

In addition, the data show positive, but non-significant,
effects on degree completion and increase in level of
education. There are several possible explanations as to
why we do not find a significant impact on these
outcomes. First, while IDAs can provide some resources,
such as financial capital and information, there are many
additional barriers faced by non-traditional students that
IDAs are not designed to address (Taniguchi & Kaufman,
2005). Second, effects on educational attainment may
take longer to develop than the 6-year time frame
between the program end and this study. This may be
especially true for non-traditional students who enroll on
a part-time basis.

The fact that IDA program participants as a whole spent
the same amount as control group members on home
repairs and yet reported lower costs of forgone repairs
suggests that, compared to the control group, they either
purchased homes that were in better condition or they
achieved more repairs for the same cost by doing home
repairs themselves. Both of these possible explanations

In subgroup analysis, evidence suggests that men may
benefit more from the IDA program in terms of
educational enrollment and attainment compared with
women. Interestingly, the administrative data (MIS IDA)
also indicates that males were more likely than females to
take a matched withdrawal for education. This is an
important finding, given that there is a disturbing trend of
declining educational attainment among minority and
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lower-income males in the United States (King, 2000; Kim,
2011). Our current data cannot illuminate the channels
through which IDAs may have this effect, and this is an
important question for future research.

Business Ownership
Among treatment group members present at Wave 4,
only 5.7% had planned at baseline to save for business
ownership. About half of those saving for business
ownership actually made a matched withdrawal. For the
full sample, the proportion of business ownership
substantially increased between baseline and Wave 4
(7% to 13% of respondents). However, there was no
significant effect of treatment on business ownership or
equity at Wave 4.
Given the small sample size of people who were saving
for business, it may not be surprising that we could not
detect an impact. Perhaps a better test of a matched
savings program on business ownership would be a
randomized control trial on a program that targets
matched saving and financial counseling only for
microenterprise. Such a program could use a design
similar to the learn$ave program, but with a greater focus
on business, rather than education.

Retirement
Among treatment group members present at Wave 4,
about 19% of the sample had planned to save for
retirement. Participants saving for retirement were among
the most likely to make a matched withdrawal. Among all
the matched withdrawals made, 16.8% were made for
retirement savings. However, we observe no statistically
significant differences between treatment and control
with regard to retirement savings outcomes.

Net Worth
Our findings indicate that there is no detectible treatment
effect of the IDA program on wealth 10 years after the
program began. This may be partly due to the nature of
the data. To provide some context, a difference in net
worth of less than $10,500 probably would not show
statistical significance due to the small sample size.

Looking at the effects on the components of wealth, the
results are mixed. After adjusting for outliers, there is a
substantial but not significant increase in total assets and
total debts with assignment to treatment. There is a
marginally significant but economically small effect of
treatment on liquid assets: assignment to treatment is
associated with $79 more in liquid assets relative to
assignment to control.
Despite the mixed results on wealth, the study
participants in both groups are doing better relative to
national patterns of wealth for low-income households.
According to recent research from the Pew Charitable
Trusts, lower-income and minority households in the U.S.
experienced major declines in wealth in the past 10 years
(Kochhar et al., 2011). This loss in wealth is not observed
among this sample, suggesting that the participants –
both treatment and control group members – were able
to maintain their financial wealth better than other
low-income families across the country.

Concluding Thoughts
In summary, out of the five allowable uses, we find some
long-term impact of IDAs on education, especially for
males, and on home maintenance and repair. We do not
find a long-term impact on homeownership, businesses,
and retirement savings. The positive findings for
education and home maintenance and repair may
suggest that IDAs are best suited to support asset
purchases that can be accomplished incrementally over a
period of time. Targeting IDAs for education and home
maintenance and repair may be more effective than
applying them to “all-or-nothing” purchases like a house.
Similarly, these findings may imply that longer savings
periods would be beneficial.
There are several possible explanations for the lack of
more substantial effects on wealth and assets found 6
years after the experiment ended. First, ADD4 participants
were self-selected into the study. The applicants had to
take the time and effort to apply for the IDA program;
thus, they were more motivated than other potentially
eligible persons. That higher level of motivation may have
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led members of the control group to find other ways to
reach their goals, including participation in other
programs. If this is the case, a larger IDA program that
includes a less motivated population or is implemented
in a location with fewer alternative resources may show
different results. Second, our sample size may be too
small, and therefore the power too weak to detect an
impact. Third, the structure of the Tulsa IDA program,
which allowed for five different qualified uses of the
matched funds, could make effects even harder to detect.
Fourth, noise and errors inherent in income, asset, and
liabilities measures make it challenging to study and
document changes in wealth. Fifth, in spite of random
assignment, some baseline differences were observed
between treatment and control group members. In
addition to these observed characteristics that were
controlled in the analysis, unobserved differences
between the groups could still exist and, if present, could
affect the impact of IDAs on the observed outcomes.
Finally, long-term efficacy of impacts is a lot to expect
from a short-term matched savings program. It is not
uncommon to find that impacts of social and economic
interventions deteriorate over time, after the treatment
group no longer enjoys special conditions compared to
the control group. Further, it raises a broader question of
whether a short-term program that provides modest
benefits to program participants can outweigh the many
other factors that influence ones’ social and economic
outcomes. At the outset of the experiment, there was
little way to know the appropriate design or “dose” of
IDAs—in program structure, saving incentives, or saving
duration. Program benefits may have to be greater or the
programs may need to have longer savings periods to
result in effects on wealth and assets 6 years after
participation ends.

Future Research
The ADD4 research has provided important insights into
the long-term effect of short-term IDAs on economic,
psychological, and health outcomes among low-income
families. The mixed effects of the treatment on program
participants indicate a need for additional research on

IDA programs in particular and asset-building efforts in
general.
The Tulsa IDA program in this experiment was among the
first IDA programs in the country when it started in 1998.
At the outset, there was little way to know the
appropriate design for an IDA, including program
structure, saving incentive, and saving duration. Based on
field experience in the intervening years, many current
IDA programs are structured differently in terms of match
rates, maximum available matches, duration, qualified
uses of the matching funds, and so on.
Specifically, most of the IDA programs today, funded
through the federal AFI program, offer a saving period of
up to 5 years (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services 2010). Therefore, the upcoming evaluation of AFI
- funded IDA programs, mandated by AFI’s authorizing
legislation, should provide new and important evidence
on the impact of IDAs. Evaluating the effects of several
contemporary AFI-funded IDA programs will help to
address some of the challenges in generalizing findings
from the Tulsa IDA program to other settings and
program designs. It is reasonable to expect that different
agencies, regions, and time periods will produce IDA
programs with different impacts on participants.
Moreover, regarding program duration, we still lack
knowledge of the effects of a long-term or indefinite IDA
savings program, structured as a 401(k), for example,
without a predetermined savings period. The original
proposal for IDAs was for lifelong, progressive accounts
(Sherraden, 1991). However, IDAs have been implemented
in a demonstration period with short-term savings
periods. It seems likely that longer-term saving could be
more effective for asset accumulation and that short-term
savings periods may be too limited to make a lasting
difference. Future research on the question of what might
happen with long-term (or life-long) matched savings
programs would be valuable to inform economic policy.
Also, because IDAs are made up of a bundle of services, it
would be valuable for both policy and research reasons to
understand the channels through which IDAs may affect
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behavior and well-being. For example, experimental
evidence from the Canadian learn$ave program indicates
that financial education and case management had a
significant impact on saving and education outcomes
(Leckie, et al. 2010). Learning more about the mechanisms
through which participation in IDAs can lead to positive
outcomes will provide an evidence base to better
structure matched savings policies and programs for
maximum efficacy.
With regard to increasing our understanding of asset
building in general, an important follow-up question from
ADD4 is how and why participants in the Tulsa IDA
experiment—treatment and control group members
alike—increased their homeownership rates by more than
a random sample of low-income households (as
evidenced by the comparison with respondents from the
PSID) and had low levels of mortgage delinquency and
foreclosure. This is particularly important given that the
study period included a time during which the economy
in general and housing markets in particular experienced
great turbulence.
To date, ADD-based research has made foundational
contributions to the field of asset-building and has been
instrumental in the development of new policies and
programs to promote economic and social mobility
among low-income families, including matched savings
accounts for adults and children, both in the U.S. and
internationally. This 10-year follow-up study is one more
contribution to our understanding on the impact of these
programs. Future research should build on this work and
provide additional evidence to inform the development
of future savings and asset-building programs for
low-income families.
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American Dream Demonstration Wave 4 Advisory Board*
Dalton Conley – Director of the Center for Advanced Social Science Research, Professor of Sociology and Public Policy at NYU; Adjunct
Professor of Community Medicine at Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York
Marion Crain – Deputy Director of the Center on Poverty, Work & Opportunity and the Paul Eaton Professor of Law at UNC Chapel Hill
School of Law
Steven Dow – Executive Director, Community Action Project of Tulsa County
Greg Duncan - Edwina S. Tarry Professor, School of Education and Social Policy Faculty Fellow, Institute for Policy Research, Northwestern University Director, Northwestern University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research
Bob Friedman - General Counsel, Founder and Chair of the Board of Directors for the Corporation for Enterprise Development
Greg Mills – Principal Associate, Abt Associates
Melvin Oliver - Professor and Dean of Social Sciences, University of Santa Barbara
Robert Plotnick – Professor of Public Affairs at Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs, Adjunct Professor of Economics, University of
Washington

*Please note: Advisory Board members are listed with the affiliations they held at the beginning of the ADD4 study; these are not their current
affiliations in all cases.
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